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ABSTRACT
With the advent of a bloody war in ex-Yugoslavia which has by now claimed 
hundreds of thousands of lives, the Balkans has once again become a focus of 
interest. Many have concentrated on the study of religion, nationalisms and 
minorities, admittedly three sources of trouble in the peninsula. It is worth 
noting that almost all Balkan states have had significant minority populations 
since their establishment. The very existence of minorities coupled with 
irredantist and chauvinist features of Balkan nationalisms as well as claims of 
homogeneity have somewhat turned minorities into potential surrogates of their 
host-states in which they live. Mother-states, to which minorities look for 
support have been regarded by their host-states as dangerous neighbors.
As a result, enormous amount of mistrust between Balkan states has come 
about, letting loose a considerable amount of combustible materiel throughout 
the Balkans. To this may be added the third source of trouble, that is the 
minorities. This work aims to analyze a somewhat peculiar relationship which 
has three dimensions, namely host-states, mother-states and minorities. It also 
aims to focus on relevant aspects of Balkan nationalisms. And it concludes 
that, in spite of a number of a triangular relationships involving these three 
actors, every case has to be treated on its own merit.
IV
ÖZET
Eski Yugoslavya'daki krizin kanlı bir çatışmaya dönüşmesiyle birlikte, çeşitli 
azınlıklara evsahipliği yapan Balkan yarımadası bir kez daha ilgi odağı haline 
geldi. Bugün dikkatler yarımadadaki sıkıntıların üç kaynağı olarak kabul 
edilen din, milliyetçilik ve azınlıklar konularına çevrilmiş durumda. Hemen 
hemen istisnasız bütün Balkan devletleri kuruldukları günden beri kayda değer 
azınlık cemaatlerine evsahipliği yapagelmiştir. Buna ilaveten, Balkan 
milliyetçiliğinin yayılmacı ve şövenist özellikleri, azınlıkları içinde yaşadıkları 
evsahibi devletler (bost States) açısından potansiyel hain konumuna 
koyabilmiştir. Bu durumda azınlıklar çevreleri tarafından kendilerine göre 
gayrı-milli olan bir devlette yabancı olarak yaşayan ve bu nedenle de kendi 
devletlerini kurma ya da bunlara katılma hayalleri peşinde olmaları muhtemel 
gruplar olarak değerlendirilmekte, öte yandan kendileri de bu bakış açısını az 
çok paylaşmakta ve kimi tavırlarıyla da bunu göstermektedirler. Bunun 
uzantısı olarak evsahibi ülkeler azınlıkların kendilerini yakın hissettikleri ana 
devletlerine (m otber States) karşı dikkatli davranma zorunluluğunu 
hissetmektedirler. Bunun tabii bir sonucu. Balkanlı devletler arasında - 
azınlığın da içine dahil olduğu- üçlü bir güvensizlik ilişkisidir. Bu çalışma, bu 
ilişkiler ağının ve Balkan milliyetçiliğinin kökenlerinin analizine katkıda 
bulunma iddiasının yanısıra bu tür üçlü ilişkilerin çeşitli örneklerini inceleyerek 
her birinin altyapısını oluşturan özgün dinamikleri de ele almaktadır.
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A glance at the history of the Balkans will reveal the fact that for much of 
its past, and also for the present, the issue of religion, nationalism and 
minorities are inseparable from the analytical point of view. During long 
Ottoman years, as the sociah system of the Empire defined the Imperial 
subjects on the basis of adherence to religious communities (i.e. M illet^  
this turned religious identity into an inalienable part of the Balkan heritage. 
In addition,since the Balkan churches -within the framework of the Millet 
system- were the sole institutions to have survived into the Ottoman 
system, they initially became a refugee for the heritage, and later (starting 
with 19th century) the perpetuators of indigenous Balkan identities.
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Thus religion had became the dominant, if not the single, social bearing, 
by the time nationalism arrived in the peninsula. Nationalism reached the 
Balkans, following the French revolution and in a rather indirect fashion 
through intermediaries. Central Europe, Greece and the Greek speaking 
peoples of the Empire were the stations through which nationalism found 
favourable terrain in the peninsula. However, this indirect course it 
followed gradually led to major modifications in the understanding of 
nationalism depending upon experiences, and interpretations of these 
intermediaries.! This brand of nationalism that bore chauvinistic, 
irredentist and historicist features under the premises of building a state for 
the supposedly already existing nation had enermous repercussions.2 Flere, 
the nation was defined on the basis of a distant -in most cases medieval- 
state and people. It soon reached point where every Balkan nationalism 
came to demand the resurrection of a glasified former state in its original 
territories.^ Such a vision (in other words a m egali idea) not only 
disregarded the existence of peoples of various religious and linguistic 
background within the boundaries of the envisaged national state, thus 
gravely ignoring the rich mix of peoples in the peninsula; but also paved 
the way to regard the peoples of different background with caution and 
gradual enmity, since their very existence held the potential to inhibit the 
fulfillment of a great idea.
This is the reason why the problem of minorities has sprung up within 
independent Balkan states. Coming into existence, individual Balkan 
states had to face the dilemma of accommodating minorities into their 
nationalist structure. This proved to be a cumbersome, if not impossible, 
task, not only because these host states lacked the will to do so, but also 
because the minorities (considering themselves as inalienable parts of other 
nations) looked to their mother states (to which they felt attached) as their 
home to be.
The resultant lack of confidence between Balkan states due to the 
precarious position the minority occupied in their eyes would be 
strengthened in time through acts such as assimilation, ethnic cleansing, 
deportation, discrimination on the past of host states; encouragement of 
separatism and belligerency on the part of mother states; and last but not 
least resistance on the part of'minorities,
Today there are numerous minority communities all around the peninsula. 
Some of these simply fall out of the scope of the perspective, discussed 
above, for various factors such as lacking a potential mother state, being too 
small in size, or having gone through a process of voluntary assimilation. 
Nevertheless there is a number of minorities all around the peninsula that 
continue to constitute serious bones of contention, deteriorating inter-state 
relations while suffering due to violation of their rights.
For the moment it seems likely that the atmosphere of mistrust prevailing 
in the Balkans is not least because of a perception of threat host states 
perceive from mother states and their own minorities, and a feeling of 
uneasiness that mother states their minority "phenomen" in neighbouring 
states feel towards host satets. Such an unpromissing situation, dominating 
inter-state relations as well as suffering of minorities is not likely to 
disappear so long as Balkan states and their minorities do not recognize the 
reality of a multi-ethnic coexistence within the framework of a state as a 
permanent given and not as a permanent and perpetual problem.
The study will be composed of three chapters. The first chapter entitled 
Nationalism, Religion and M inorities in the Balkans aims to shed light on 
the history of the peninsula, emergence of nationalisms in the Balkans, the 
extent to which nationalism and religion have been intertwined, as well as 
the situation of Balkan minorities within the process of the establishment 
of nation-states.
The second chapter under the heading. The Balkan M inorities starts off 
with an assessment of the factors that might help to define what a minority 
community in the Balkans is. Then, the chapter goes on to analyze each 
Balkan country with special reference to its minorities. It offers a historical 
background to the minority groups and then describes the current situation 
of these minorities. This perspective should be of some use in setting out 
why some minorities are more likely to be a part of a stressful relationship 
between mother and host states than others wliich seem to experience a 
more peaceful existence.
The final chapter, the Security Dimension begins with a theoretical review 
of the security concept and the dimensions of Balkan security. Then it 
attempts to determine the dynamics, underlying the triangular relationship 
between mother state, a host state and a minority. After a theoretical and 
an analytical framework, the final chapter proceeds to analyze likely 
triangular relationships of distrust in the Balkans. Seven cases are analyzed 
to shed light on the existing mutual perceptions of threat, mistrust and 
uneasiness. Identifying these as major causes of Balkan-wide instability, 
the concluding chapter sums up the general situation in the Balkans and 
then finalizes by making offers for possible solutions to break up this self- 
perpetuating vicious circle.
The contribution the present dissertation claims to make to the scholarship 
lies in the fact that most studies on Balkan minorities up to the present 
have either been mere surveys carried out by Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO’s), or works which examine the issue from the point 
of view of global or bi-polar security concerns, disregarding particular 
dynamics of the Balkans. This work that analyzes Balkan security from the 
perspective of minorities and the role played by them in inter-state 
relations contributes to the aforementioned studies, which are mostly 
descriptive. Among the very tew studies which have focused on security
issues in the Balkans, few of them have put forward a framework in which 
to examine Balkan minorities similar to the one that the present study has 
come up with. Though it is attempted here to classify the minorities in 
the region from a security point of view, care has been taken to avoid the 
trap into which most outsiders seem to fall as a previous article has put it:
"it appears fairly plausible to the outsiders to 
enumerate all minorities and then put forward over­
simplified and over-generalized appraisal of the 
situation as well as solution proposals to all related 
problems. However, closer examination of the 
minorities and their relations with the host state in 
which they live and the host state’s perception of a 
given minority suggests that every case in the region 
must be treated on its own merit. But, depending on 
from what perspective this question is handled, there 
may be some room for classification." ^
In analyzing Balkan security, the present study will thus classify minorities 
in the peninsula into two categories: minorities with mother states (i.e. 
minorities as actors in inter-state relations), and second, minorities without 
mother states (i.e. minorities without possible roles as actors in inter-state 
relations). Hereby there seems to be a number of ways, depending upon 
one’s analytical perspective, to classify Balkan minorities. A classification 
as the one attempted here seems to be the most appropriate for this study.
It must be acknowledged at the outset that threre are some practical 
difficulties regarding the boundaries of the Balkans. Therefore, the study 
limits itself only to the typical Balkan countries such as Albania, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Macedonia, Slovenia, Romania and 
the New Yugoslavia, for reasons discussed in Chapter 2.1. Thus, the 
present study excludes neighboring countries such as Austria, Hungary, 
Italy and Turkey from its analytical perspective. This is because of the 
fact that these countries seem to have at least as many non-Balkan features 
as their Balkanic features. Likewise, one should also note that these 
countries have a number of non-Balkan minorities and that the inclusion of 
these countries into a discussion of the Balkan minorities is likely to 
provide more confusion than clarity. Turkey, a typical example to these
semi-Balkan regional countries, for instance, has historically had strong 
Balkan features. However, especially given its 20th century history and 
demographic make-up, as well as the development of its political culture it 
is now a country that can hardly be placed into the Balkan framework as it 
would be the case for example, for Albania.
2.1. BOUNDARIES OF TH E PENINSULA
Geographically speaking, a roughly triangular land mass located in southeast 
Europe pointing to the Mediterranean to the south, its base facing central 
Europe to the north from which it is separated by the Danube-Sava river line 
might well be defined as the Balkan peninsula. It is flanked by the Adriatic 
and the Ionian seas to the west and the Black, Marmara and the Aegean seas 
to the east. A glance at the history of the Balkans points to the fact that the 
region, though fairly mountainous and to an extent insular protected by seas 
and a number of rivers, has lacked clear-cut political borders throughout 
centuries. These geographical features encircling the peninsula have by no 
means been sufficient to create barriers to politically isolate the region. If 
anything, numerous islands and bridge ways around the peninsula like the 
Aegean and the Adriatic islands as well as the Turkish Straits form 
springboards into the peninsula from its environs. This is how Orthodoxy, the 
Ottoman Empire, Turks and Islam from the east, and the Romans and 
Catholicism from the west have made inroads into the Balkans.*
The northern boundaries, where geographical limits are even less concrete, 
have allowed more penetration for ages. For instance, the Danube with its 
various tributaries opens up gateways into the peninsula from Central Europe 
such as the vast Pannonian Plains. The Black Sea lowlands in the east, around 
the Danubian Delta also create another passage into the peninsula. It is 
through these gateways that the Goths, Huns, Avars, Bulgars, Slavs, 
Protestanism, the Habsburgs and the Germans have made their way into the 
peninsula. In addition to the geographical features delineating the Balkans, 
the strategic location of the peninsula as a bridge between Central Europe and 
the Middle East has made these geographical barriers all but more penetrable.
CHAPTER II. NATIONALISM, RELIGION AND MINORITIES IN
TH E BALKANS
That is to say that, while the geographical borders of the peninsula seem clear, 
there does not appear a general agreement among the scholars upon its 
political boundaries which have in fact fluctuated for ages.
Therefore, every study seeking to search on various aspects of the Balkans 
may make its own definition of the borders in accordance with its aims. For 
instance, the narrowest geographic delimitation of the Balkans would dictate a 
peninsula lying to south of the Danube-Sava line. This borderline, a 
reminiscent of the outer limits of direct, and uninterrupted Ottoman rule from 
15th to 19th centuries would include modern Albania, Bosnia-FIerzegovina, 
Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and the new Yugoslavia.
Such a narrow delimitation would, however, ignore Balkan political 
experience. Therefore, political and cultural criteria is needed to clarify geo­
political boundaries of the Balkans. Political unity between lands to the north 
and south of the Danube, as well as shared cultural and political features as 
can be observed in the Romanian example between the Romanian speaking 
populations of the Regat and the Habsburg lands would make the above 
geographical definitions incomplete. It is clear that the political boundaries of 
the peninsula would exceed the geographically defined frontiers which have 
in fact never isolated the peninsula from its exterior. A wider Balkan picture 
should, therefore add the whole of ex-Yugoslavia and also Romania to the 
aforementioned countries. All these states cited will be referred to as core 
Balkan countries, in the sense that they reciprocate, to the largest possible 
extent, to the political and geographical definitions of the peninsula.
In addition, there appear some neighboring countries such as Austria, 
Hungary, Italy and Turkey which have distinguishing characters with regards 
to their relations with the Balkans. These states may well be referred to as 
semi-Balkan countries. These semi-Balkan countries seem to have some 
common features in their relations with the Balkans. First of all, all of them 
exercised political control over parts of the peninsula in the past.2 Venetians 
and later Italy controlled the Dalmatian coastline; Hungarian Kingdom, later 
the Habsburgs and then the Dual Monarchy, held tight control in the form of 
sovereignty over northern and northwestern Balkans and finally the Ottomans 
maintained rule over much of the Balkan territory for about half a millennium. 
In addition, these four states have special links with various minorities of their 
own national/ imperial heritage all over the Balkans. For instance, Germans 
and Magyars in Romania, the new Yugoslavia and Croatia; Italians in Croatia 
and Slovenia; and Turks in Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Romania are 
only few examples worth mentioning. Their historical links as well as current
circumstances seem to place four countries into a special position vis-à-vis the 
Balkans. The political influence these countries have possessed in contribut­
ing to the flow of events of the peninsula and also the fact that these countries 
are in return vulnerable to inter-Balkan development further clarifies this 
unique position.
2.2. GEOGRAPHY AND LAND IN TH E BALKANS
The Balkan peninsula has a rugged terrain, as its Turkish name denotes, with 
five mountain ranges; the Dinar, Pindus, Balkan, Rhodope and the 
Transylvanian/ Carpathian reaching altitudes well above 1000 meters. The 
Dinar and Pindus ranges extending in the west all the way from north to south 
as massive walls parallel to the Adriatic are pierced by various river valleys and 
passes, such as the Neretva, Drina, Drin and Shkumbi rivers and the Peach 
Tree Pass, allowing entry into the interior despite the difficult nature of the 
terrain.^
To the east of these mountains the Danube and low-lying plains around it 
dominate the landscape. This great river entering into the peninsula, then 
waters extensive plains together with its tributaries such as, the Tizsa, Drava 
and Sava, flows in between the Moesian (Bulgaria) and Wallachian 
(Romania) plains before it reaches the Black Sea around the Moldovan plains 
and the Danubian marshlands Danubian delta.
To the north of the Danube, the Transylvanian range separates the upper 
Danubian (the Pannonian) plains from the lower Danubian (the Romanian) 
plains. In the southeast of the peninsula the Thracian and Macedonian plains 
are encircled by the Balkan and Rhodope ranges which allow through river 
valleys such as the Vardar, Morova and the Maritsa passage into the interior.
These features of the region present us the following features in relation to 
the demographic history of the peninsula: the geographical features and the 
morphology of the Balkans such as the natural corridors around and through 
the peninsula helped to increase the penetrability and the freedom of 
movement through the peninsula. This phenomena itself has produced two 
outstanding results: the exposure of Balkans to foreign influence, domination 
and eventual conquest; and also possibility of continuous shift and movement
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of peoples throughout the region. The effects of such geo-political facts have 
contributed to a large extent to the making up of specific regional features: the 
never ending entry of new peoples into the Balkan stage, and the inescapable 
ethnic mix of the peninsula. These phenomena have been caricaturized by 
the French cuisine with the "Balkanique" name given to mix salad: the 
Macedoine.
2.3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: TH E BALKANS BEFORE 19th 
CENTURY
The arrival of Slavs to the Balkans by the 7th century is no doubt a significant 
date in the history of the peninsula. The Romans and Byzantines who had 
entered the peninsula in the previous centuries to control the native 
autochthonous peoples (i.e. the Greeks, Thracians and Illyrians) of the region 
had not intended to inhabit the peninsula for good. The Huns, Goths and 
Avars coming from the north had been too restless to influence the peninsula 
with their permanent presence; instead they were to be assimilated by the 
locals.
After that, the Slavic presence giving the peninsula a strong flavour lasted till 
the arrival of the Ottomans from the east. The Ottoman conquest of nearly 
the entire Balkans was completed in less than 200 years, between the mid 
14th and early 16th centuries. The long lasting Ottoman rule was balanced 
only by the arrival of the Habsburgs onto the stage. By the 18th century, the 
Habsburgs captured -in addition to Slovenia and parts of Hungary already 
possessed by Vienna- rest of Hungary, Croatia, Vojvodina, Transylvania and 
the Banat. From then onwards starting with the treaty of Passarowitz in 1718, 
by which the Habsburgs obtained northern and northwestern Balkans, until 
19th century, the age of nationalisms in the Balkans, the borders were 
somewhat stabilized with little exception of gradual Russian drang from the 
northeast.“*
By the 19th century, the Habsburgs and Ottoman Empires shared similarities. 
They both included a large variety of Balkan peoples, who differed a lot in 
confessions and idioms as well as social and cultural features. The Ottomans 
and the Habsburgs had always paid great attention to the maintenance of their 
empires. In these imperial structures the diversity of the Balkans was given 
no particular attention. On the contrary, the Millet system and the non-ethnic 
monarchical tradition (materialized in the Edict of Toleration of Emperor 
Joseph) of these empires had maintained a balance in the peninsula.
This "magic spill" did not, however, last long. The emergence of nationalist 
ideas in Europe was a major turning point. "In West Europe nationalism arose 
in an effort to build a nation in the political reality and struggle of the 
present...(It) followed or coincided a certain period of centralization" , to such 
an extent that societies were homogenized around the notion of a sovereign 
people living within the territory of an already existing state, aspiring to form a 
nation-state on that basis.^
These new ideas soon reached the Balkans. For the Ottoman and Flabsburg 
establishments nationalism was at least a set of incomprehensible ideas, if not 
anathema. For the Balkan peoples, however, nationalism meant new horizons.
Nationalism entered the Ottoman Balkans through the links of Balkan 
societies with European milieu.^ The Balkans were definitely not 
experiencing the drastic social and political transformation Western Europe 
was undergoing at the time; therefore, nationalism was given by the Balkan 
peoples a different interpretation than what it had stood for in Western 
Europe.·^
As nationalism began to be adopted for local use, it did not take long for 
nationalist ideas to spread around the Balkans. At first, nationalism addressed 
those segments of the society discontented with the establishment by offering 
them the opportunity to change the system to their advantage and take the 
matters into their hands. The peasantry and the intelligentsia were among 
these segments. Declining rural conditions, the gradual transformation of the 
timar system into the chiflik system which caused enormous distress among
2.4. NATIONALISM IN TH E BALKANS
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thee peasantry had already turned into a potential community of resistance.® 
For such a community of resistance, nationalism was just the perfect course to 
create a shared identity, a feeling of belonging, which the community could 
use as a means of cohesiveness. To the intellectuals who were aspiring to 
follow European patterns, uniting the people around the idea of political 
resistance seemed suitable too. In addition, nationalism prepared the ground 
for the future goal of ousting foreign domination. Inasmuch as it was centered 
around the idea of creating a common identity to serve the goal of resistance 
and a prospective future state, nationalism produced peculiar results in the 
Balkans. Here a "nation was created out of the myths of the past and the 
dreams of the future, an ideal fatherland, closely linked with the past, devoid 
of any immediate connection with the present and expected to become 
sometime a political reality".^
In fact, foreign influence and domination were now regarded as nothing but 
barriers on the way of the nation-building, which was otherwise destined for 
success. Within that framework a need arose to convince the people about 
their greatness and superiority, "by making them aware of their past"i®. Here, 
the use of historical legacies came in. The nation was united around the idea 
of a distinct but glorious past, which served as the basis of the national 
identity. In addition, as the Balkan peoples began to turn to past to dig for 
their national characteristics, linguistic affinities, historical evidence, religious 
features and historical rights, they came to realize that in the Balkans 
centuries of Ottoman imperial rule and the Millet system had blended all such 
features into a mixture that was marked by religion. Therefore, by the age of 
nationalisms when a search into history was conducted, religion came to the 
forefront to serve as the vehicle for nationalism.!^ Having preserved an heri­
tage within its body, religion and its component, the church provided for the 
necessary basis to initialize nationalist movements. The existence of the 
nation was justified on the basis of past structures, such as medieval kingdoms 
and churches.
The political orientation of nationalism towards a nation-state produced two 
main results. First historicism, that is the idea of a national mission and 
distortion of history for that purpose. And based on this, irredentism in the 
search towards the maximum boundaries of the future state, which were to be 
defined through historical criteria.
11
Heavy emphasis on the past and history was placed to undermine present 
circumstances. Taking into consideration the ethnic mix of the Balkans, any 
such nationalist movement in the Balkans was doomed to face certain 
unpredictable problems. The existence of a multitude of peoples ("future 
nations") over a territory which by nationalist definition could belong to "one 
nation" only was likely to become a major issue. To cope with this issue of 
intermingled peoples, Balkan nationalisms developed another distinctive 
feature: the elimination of other alien peoples, who were regarded as 
"potential enemies" to the national cause as they would stand in the way of the 
establishment of the future state for the "nation". Therefore, efforts to 
overcome these "diffuculties" were justified so long as they served the 
ultimate goal. Peaceful assimilation, physical extermination, where 
appropriate, as well as cultural manipulative tricks (i.e. denial of the identity 
of the "other", so as to make the other susceptible for integration) were all 
welcome. Through the entire 19th century, dealing with "others" became an 
important part of the agenda of Balkan n a t io n a lis m s .Even when a certain 
nation managed to establish its own state, such concerns did not evaporate. If 
anything, the new state apparatus functioned as a valuable means to achieve 
the ultimate goal of eliminating the "others" within the young nation-state.
In the case where a nation-state was established, the "others" therein also (i.e. 
the minorities) regarded this nation-state as alien to their presence. The 
minorities regarded the nation-state as barriers, cutting them off from the bulk 
of their nation, and their respective nation-state. Therefore, they nurtured 
aspirations towards joining their mother states (i.e. the state to which a 
minority would feel attached because of perceived political and national 
similarities). The forceful efforts of the home states (where the minority 
actually lived) only accelerated such tendencies of the minorities.
During the nation building process through the 19th century the Balkans 
witnessed two consecutive periods. The first period was one of a struggle 
through violent and political means to establish a nation-state while 
minimizing the threats posed to the realization of that goal by rival outsiders. 
The next period, coming with the nation-state, was again dominated by the 
continuing struggle between competing "nations". This last stage has in fact 
lasted into our age, only strengthening the existing mistrust between the 
home states and minorities, while causing deterioration in the relations
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between the mother states and home states. This is the reason why the issue 
of minorities in the Balkans needs to be handled with great care with 
continuous references to the past and the present.
2.5. RELIGION IN TH E BALKANS
2.5.1. Orthodoxy; the Patriarchate and the Balkan churches under the 
Ottomans
The Ottoman social system as of mid 16th century was organized on the basis 
of religious communities each existing separately within its own institution 
surviving the reorganization under the Ottomans. Therefore and especially on 
rural basis the church remained as an authentic entity sustaining a certain 
identity till the age of nationalisms. Where the Orthodox peoples of the 
Balkans were organized to be a single church community, this did not mean 
that they would finally adopt a common identity based on the notion of 
Orthodoxy. 13
The Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, under whose authority the 
Orthodox peoples of the Empire had been placed, had began to gain 
predominance following the conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans. 
The Patriarchate with the appointment of Gennadius, a staunch anti-Catholic, 
to its head became a clear-cut Ottoman institution. In fact, the abolishment of 
the Tirnovo Patriarchate in 1393, and the Pec (Ipek) Patriarchate in 1459 
consolidated the power of the Patriarchate by widening the scope and 
solidifying the nature of its jurisdiction. With the subjugation of the Ohrid 
Patriarchate, the last of the Balkan Orthodoxy centers, this scheme was 
completed. Therefore, as the Ottoman Empire expanded, so did the 
jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. The Patriarchate had been basically a 
Byzantine institution with its tradition and liturgy. With the enlargement of 
its jurisdiction, an event which lasted about a hundred years; the liturgy, 
language and tradition of the Byzantine-Greek church infiltrated the Slavic 
churches. Where education could be supplied only through the church under 
the Millet system, the Patriarchate enjoyed a form of cultural hegemony over 
all the orthodox Balkan peoples.
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This hegemony was interrupted in the 16th century as the Empire expanded 
into the northern Balkans. The Byzantine-Greek influence came to a low tide 
with "the Turkish conquest of Hungary (1520), which finally persuaded the 
south Slavs that Turkish rule was durable, and that they had better 
accommodate themselves to it. Another reason was that, whereas few Greeks 
accepted Islam, a larger proportion of the Slavic inhabitants of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina turned Muslim and thereby became eligible for high o ffices.A s 
a result of this trend, "in 1557, the famous Grand Vizier Mohammed Sokolovic 
(Sokollu), a Serb by birth, used his influence to restore the Patriarchate of Pec. 
During the following centuries this institution assumed the functions of the 
former Serbian kingdom. It had its own law courts and administrative system, 
and when the occasion arose, it conducted foreign policy and even provided 
military leadership".
In addition to the Pec Patriarchate, the recognition of authority of the Ohrid 
Patriarchate contributed to strengthening the Slavic element in the Empire, 
and facilitated its survival by providing it with its own institutions.
With, however, changing circumstances the Slavic tide came to an ebb soon. 
"If the Slavs had ruled the Empire in the sixteenth century, the Greeks had 
taken their place by the eighteenth. One reason for this was that the Slavs 
discredited themselves by supporting the Habsburgs whenever they crossed 
the Danube. Another was that from the mid-seventeenth century onward the 
Turks began to encounter formidable complications in the conduct of their 
foreign relations". Increased need for the know-how of the urban 
/Gonstantinopolese (Phanariote) Greeks brought them back onto the scene. 
As a result, "the Phanariotes and other Greek elements were gaining influence 
in Constantinople. This combination led to the abolition of the Ipek 
Patriarchate in 1766 and of the Ohrid Arch bishopric the following year. The 
Constantinople Patriarchate once more reigned supreme in the peninsula. It 
continued to do so as long as the Balkan peoples remained subject to the
Ottoman authority".17
The Patriarchate obtained a prestigious position to the extent that in most 
cases the authority of the Patriarchate was to be associated with that of the 
Ottoman rulers. Meanwhile, continuing Greek domination in the 
establishment of the Patriarchate had reinitiated the previous trend of
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Grekofication. Through association with the Greek tradition and use of the 
Greek language, the non-Greek speaking portions of the Orthodox urban 
population had lived through a phase of Grekoficationd^ The persistence of 
non-Greek church traditions, especially in the countryside, however, 
prevented a mass scale assimilation of the Balkan peoples. In fact it could be 
argued that even under the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, 
the Slavic Balkan masses retained their distinctive identities with the aid of 
their provincial churches.
The Millet system and the cooperation of the Patriarchate helped Ottoman 
rule to become more acceptable in the eyes of the peasantry. This acceptance 
lasted as long as the Ottoman system continued to function well. 
Transformation of the timar system into the chiflik system, increased financial 
and social burdens arising therefrom and a less prosperous and secure life were 
the results of a decline in the Ottoman system. And the Patriarchate became 
too associated with the misdemeanors of the Ottoman system. Now seen as a 
collaborator, the Patriarchate was viewed with dislike and distrust by the 
people just like the Ottoman rule itself. Therefore, as the imperial frontiers 
shrunk back to Constantinople, so did the jurisdiction of the Patriarchate. 
One after the other, the Balkan nations rebelled against the Ottomans to gain 
their independence and against the Patriarchate to gain their autocephalous 
churches. By the end of W.W.I, the Ottomans and the Patriarchate controlled 
overlapping territories in the Balkans: the mere environs of the city of 
Constantinople.
2-5.2. Islam and the Millet System in the Balkans
Islam came to the Balkans with the Turks who stepped on the Balkan soil in 
the mid 14th century through the Dardanelles port town, Gallipoli. In less 
than a century after their arrival, approximately by the time of the conquest of 
Constantinople in 1453, the Ottomans had managed to establish control over 
large sections of the peninsula covering Thrace, Macedonia, Bulgaria, 
Kosovo/a, Thessaly, Epirus and parts of modern Serbia.
The Ottomans had brought with themselves a different social and political 
system. The rural life and the land system regulated under the Timar system 
brought about relative wealth in the region thus deriving mass support for the
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Ottomans especially among the peasantry stricken hard by financial burdens 
and social instability of the pre-Ottoman period. The loyalty of peasantry to, 
and its satisfaction with, the Ottoman conquerors did not, however, mean 
mass conversion to Islam. The Ottomans would in fact refrain from 
encouraging such conversion. Ottoman policy towards religions stemming 
from Islamic philosophy would eschew encouraging conversions as it was 
required to handle the ehl-i kitab, "people of the book" with tolerance. The 
people of the book, dhimmis were requested under the Islamic law to accept 
specific obligations in return for the safety accorded to them.
The Millet system established to locate each of the three acceptable faiths 
(Islam, Christianity and Judaism) into a separate sphere granted a form of 
autonomy in communal affairs to each of the faiths.20 It, however, involved 
placing numerous Orthodox peoples under the newly formed Rum Millet 
headed by the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople. Most of those peoples, 
previously under the reign of their respective Balkan churches, such as the 
Patriarchates of Tirnovo (in the Bulgarian kingdom) and Pec (in the Serbian 
kingdom), and also the Arch bishopric of Ohrid were now blended into the 
main body of the Rum Millet.
During the initial period of Ottoman rule until mid-15th century and within 
the framework of the tolerative Millet system -except for few minor cases of 
conversions- Islamicization in the Balkans came about only through 
colonization. It was an Ottoman policy to resettle peoples for the maint­
enance of demographic, political and social stability. Therefore, as the 
Ottoman armies proceeded into the peninsula, nomadic or semi-settled 
Turkic tribes from Anatolia were transferred into the peninsula to populate 
the newly conquered territories.
The colonization served various practical purposes: the repopulation of the 
war-torn and depopulated areas; maintenance of population balance in favor of 
the Ottoman Turks; rejuvenation of economic and social life; establishing 
logistics basis for the military such as garrisons; and finally providing a colonial 
destination for criminal punishment practices.
Through colonization the fertile lowlands of Thrace, Macedonia and Bulgaria 
were soon to be repopulated. Especially in these three regions the policy of
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resettlement helped establish a strong economic, strategic and military basis 
for further Ottoman penetration into the peninsula. As soon as the Ottomans 
were secure about their position and thus regarded the Balkans as home rather 
than an alien land, the policy of colonization came to a low tide. The 
strengthening of Ottoman position in Serbia, Bosnia, Albania, the 
Peleponnesus, the Danubian Principalities, Hungary and Ottoman Croatia 
helped to create such self-confidence. Ottoman position was to be further 
enhanced by mass conversion in Bosnia, an event after which this land turned 
into a stronghold of Ottoman defense line in Western Balkans.21
Sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries witnessed two major developments 
regarding Islam’s existence in the Balkans. The first was the loss of Hungary, 
Transylvania and the Ottoman Croatia and the exodus of the Ottoman 
Muslims out of these places into the rest of the Balkan territories thus creating 
a kind of negative population pressure.22 This increased Muslim population in 
the Ottoman Balkan lands and intensified competition for land and position, 
putting burdens on the local Christian population. The second development 
was a new tide of conversions. As Inalcik states, the introduction of firearms 
into the battle field had forced the Ottomans to make use of this new 
technology.23 Lacking skilled infantry of this nature, the Ottomans turned 
towards the local peoples of the Balkans, mainly the Christian Albanians and 
the Bulgarians of the highlands, who had already started to benefit from rifles 
in the pursuit of their tribal goals. The introduction of these tribal mountain 
peoples, who had been peripheral in the Ottoman affairs till then, into the 
Ottoman mainstream brought about their gradual assimilation into the urban 
Ottoman culture. The process matured as mass numbers of Albanians and 
Slavobulgars (to be called later as Pomaks) accepted the new faith.
Eighteenth and nineteenth centuries saw the decline of the Ottoman land 
system, whereby the non-hereditary and state sanctioned timar system was 
transformed into hereditary and arbitrary chiflik system. This came as a major 
blow to Ottoman presence in the Balkans. In fact, declining prosperity 
together with increased tax burdens and repression turned the Ottoman 
system in the eyes of the local population into less than being desirable. In 
tandem with this, Islam -which was identified with the Ottomans due to the 
fact that it was initiated, nurtured and practiced by the Ottomans- also 
suffered a loss of prestige.
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In the nineteenth century, new territorial losses contributed considerably to 
the negative population pressure on the locals. Expelled from the newly or 
de-facto independent ex-Ottoman territoj;ies such as Greece or Serbia the 
muhajirs gravitated towards those territories still under Ottoman control. 
These Muslim muhajirs pulling back with the Ottoman armies to add up to 
the privileged ruling strata were less than welcome -if not totally undesired- 
by the Christians who were already under difficult economic and social
conditions.24
Islam’s low tide came to a climax by the end of the nineteenth century, 
inasmuch as every time the Ottomans suffered from new territorial losses, the 
Islamic presence and influence in the Balkans did likewise. Thus the end of 
the Balkan Wars found the Ottoman territories in the Balkans minimized with 
large Muslim Balkan populations transferred into Anatolia. The population 
exchanges of 1920’s only increased these centripetal tendencies towards 
Anatolia, with more and more Muslims pushed towards Turkey now and then. 
In fact, the de-Islamization of the Balkans has continued through the rest of 
the twentieth century, with repeated voluntary and/or forced migrations to 
Turkey occurring sporadically as late as 1990’s.
2.5.3. Catholicism in the Balkans
Much of the history of the Catholicism in the Balkans stems from the rivalry 
between the Eastern and Western churches. Rome, as one of the five original 
Patriarchates of early Christendom (the other four being Constantinople, 
Jerusalem, Antioch and Alexandria) always struggled with Constantinople over 
the control of the Balkan territories, occasionally making common cause with 
other Patriarchates.
This rivalry became more pronounced following the division of the Roman 
Empire into two, which brought about a fault line to cut through the Balkans 
leaving the Pannonian Plains, Slovenia, Croatia, Dalmatia and Bosnia- 
Herzegovina under the sovereignty of the West Roman Empire and, by 
implication the jurisdiction of the Papal authority. To our date, this cleavage 
has survived placing the east of this line under the sphere of Orthodoxy, 
except certain areas where Islam flourished during the long centuries of 
Ottoman rule.
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The Church Schism of 1054 exacerbated the situation in the Balkans, by 
formalizing the religious cleavage, and further antagonizing the parties. The 
legacy of this ancient rivalry was to foster and escalate a number of political 
and social conflicts in the peninsula, as Orthodoxy and Catholicism 
condemned each other for being heretics, each claiming that it holds 
superiority vis-à-vis the other. There is little doubt that certain features of 
Ottoman social organization such as the establishment of ecclesiastical 
communities facilitated the survival of -if not actually perpetuated- these 
exclusive legacies.
Thanks to the Millet system the Orthodox Church became the sole Balkan 
institution that survived the Ottoman conquest. This not only facilitated a 
strengthening in the Church’s position to the demise of certain ethnic 
differences, now that all the Balkan peoples identified themselves through 
adherence to it but also enhanced the position of the Orthodox Church vis-à- 
vis the Catholic Church through an improvement in its power and status.^s
The Catholics were less numerous in the Empire than the Orthodox, and 
much less numerous once the predominantly Catholic Hungary and Ottoman 
Croatia -where the bulk of the Ottoman Catholic Millet lived- as well as 
Transylvania and the Banat were lost to the Habsburgs by early 18th century. 
Even then the Catholic Church continued to nurture a religious identity - 
similar to the Orthodox church- that blanketed ethnic differences and 
claimed spiritual superiority towards the Orthodox.
2.5.4. Inter-religious clashes
It is not surprising, therefore, to see that in the age of nationalisms, newly 
emerging national identities and claims were nurtured, if not dominated, by 
religion. Given that Islam had by then made considerable headway in to the 
peninsula alongside these two principal Christian sects, religion began to play 
a determining role in defining national identities.
7'his phenomena is best exhibited by the example of Croatian and Serbian 
nationalisms.26 Today, the main criterion for defining a Serb or a Croat is his 
religion. In a similar tashion, in Transylvania, where, during the Habsburg 
era, a majority Orthodox. Romanian speaking population was controlled by a
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minority of Magyar and German speaking -the former being predominantly 
Catholic together with a number of Protestants and the latter just the 
opposite- national identification was based strongly on the religious criteria.
Yet, the cleavage between Islam and Christianity has been another source for 
nurturing national identities. The association of Islam with late Ottoman 
misrule, corruption and hegemony has served the cause of Balkan nationalisms 
which were staunchly anti-establishment (anti-Ottoman that is) in the 
beginning. In tandem with this drive to get rid of the Ottoman political rule, 
Christianity (or Orthodoxy to be more specific) was one of the main 
components of anti-Ottoman nationalistic discourse. With its position as the 
religion of the ruling strata, and under the impact of Koran’s umma 
ecumenism, Islam was a relatively late comer onto the arena of nationalisms. 
Even then, in the face of hostility from various Balkan nationalist movements 
to define Islam as alien, Islam has come out in specific cases defining national 
identities.27 The Muslim national identity, however awkward that may still 
sound, as is the situation in Bosnia, is the most striking example. Although 
religion has been a major actor in the arena of nationalisms, there may be a 
few exceptions. The Albanian people, for example, composed of four different 
faiths, Islam (Sunni & Bektashi) and Christianity (Catholicism & Orthodoxy) 
have still been united around the common identity of being Albanian.
In focusing on how religions have formed the basis for national identities, 
another point to be born in mind is that such relationship, once established 
may turn the other way around as well. Especially in the example of the 
Orthodox nations, the sheer fact that religion determines national identity 
develops after a while into a case where religion gains a national character. 
The link established between religion and nationalism becomes after a while 
interwoven with the influence of nationalists practice. The more national 
conflicts are dominated by the church (as has been the case in Macedonia 
between Greek and Bulgarian nationalisms) the higher are the chances for the 
church to become a national one. The outcome of this process has been the 
establishment of national Orthodox churches in the Balkans. In that respect 
Orthodoxy proves to be far from being a cohesive factor -in the purely 
religious context- in the Balkan affairs.
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2.5.5. Evangelism in the Balkans
Besides the three major religions of the peninsula Evangelism and Judaism are 
the two minor faiths of the region.
Historically, the presence of Evangelism, and various sects of it such as 
Lutheranism and Calvinism can be traced to the German presence in the 
Balkans. German penetration into the Balkans following the Habsburg 
domination introduced Evangelism to sections of the peninsula such as the 
Banat, Transylvania, Bukovina, Hungary and the Васка. By the 18th century. 
Evangelism was the faith of many German and Magyar communities in these 
areas.28
Most of these Evangelical communities have not actually made it to our date 
due to 20th century developments. When, following W.W.II, most Germans 
living in Romania and Yugoslavia were removed from their respective 
countries -due to claims, some of them not groundless, that they cooperated 
with the Nazis during the war- in accordance with post-war settlements; 
Evangelical presence in the Balkans decreased considerably to a few 
predominantly Magyar speaking communities.
2.5.6. Judaism in the Balkans
It seems possible to draw similarities between the fate of the Jews in the 
Balkans and that of the Evangelicals, since, also in the Jewish case, we could 
find only traces of what was once upon a time a thriving community.
The Jews arrived into the Balkans via land and sea routes. Those arriving 
from the sea came originally from Iberia, Sephardic Jews, who, fleeing the 
inquisition, settled in the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans with permission 
from the Sultan.29 Constantinople, Sarajevo and Salónica, actually called the 
second Jerusalem were only a few of the many Balkan towns in which sizable 
Jewish communities existed right up to W.W.II. Extermination in the hands 
of the Nazis and their local partners (in Greece and parts of Yugoslavia), or 
migration to Israel following the war (in Bulgaria and Turkey) were the two 
means through which the Ottoman Jewish population was reduced from a total 
of hundred thousands down to a few ten thousands.
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The other Jewish community, the Ashkenazi, arrived into the Balkans from 
the north over land. Coming in with German penetration, the Ashkenazi Jews 
settled in the Habsburg dominated parts of the Balkans. In addition, as late as 
19th century, more Ashkenazim, this time Russian Jews, escaping the 
pogroms settled in the Danubian Principalities. The Romanian, Hungarian 
and Northern Yugoslav Jews also suffered from W.W.II and the Nazi 
collaborators in these countries, to such an extent that the number of 
Ashkenazi communities in northern Balkans came down to a bare few
thousands.30
2.6. RELIGION AND MINORITIES IN TH E BALKANS
The relationship in which religion has contributed to the nationalist cause has 
already been analyzed. The merger of religious identities into national 
identities has resulted in the fact that minorities -to a large extent- have been 
defined through their religion.
This has been true especially in the case where neighboring groups have been 
of different religious origins, so that a minority population living by a majority 
population is identifiable through its faith. It is not rare in the Balkans that the 
majority-minority dichotomy turns into a religions one. The case of the 
Turks, Pomaks, Roma of Greece and Bulgaria who are identified through their 
Islamic faith as opposed to the Orthodox majority, is a clear example to such 
dichotomy. Inasmuch as religion has been one of the most distinguishing 
factors defining one’s nationality, other factors such as language, ethnicity 
taken to be related to the formation of national identity have been eclipsed 
initially by religion.3i
Nevertheless the role played by religion in shaping up national identity should 
not be generalized to cover all cases. For instance, in the Macedonian case 
where three nationalisms, all Orthodox, lay claims on this land and its people, 
linguistic, historical and ethnic criteria most certainly upstage religious ones.
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Some distinctive features of Balkan nationalisms as proven by historical 
evidence may be summarized as follows:
i. a distinct political orientation based on the need to establish a state for the 
nation and sustain the same state at whatever cost.
ii. the impact of religion, where religion shaping to nationalism as its main 
pillar, becomes in turn "nationalized".
iii. the notion of an historical mission, a Great Idea producing a unification 
around a messianic zeal to achieve a future goal.
iv. and last but not least, coming out of a synthesis of the above factors: a 
rather unrealistic context. Making continuous references to the past while 
looking to the future has contributed to a main dilemma of the Balkan 
nationalisms: undermining present circumstances. Given the nature of the 
Balkan populations as a mix of various religions, languages, cultures and 
peoples, any failure to take the present circumstances into consideration 
would deserve to be called as unrealistic. This dilemma has caused and still 
causes problems for Balkan nationalisms.
Irredentism, is one method Balkan nationalisms utilize in pursuing their goals 
should present circumstances inhibit them. Here, the definition of a Great 
State -justified by the use and distraction of historical legacies- which 
encompasses territories that actually overlap other Great States is one 
dilemma where the delineation of borders without any consideration of the 
ethnic make up of the territories is another one.
To these may be added the resultant severe problem faced by Balkan 
nationalisms: the dilemma of minorities.
As a product of the nation-state building process, and also owing to unrealistic 
aspirations which have given more credit to history than to existing 
circumstances, large minorities have been left within the boundaries of all
2-7. ТЫЕ DILEMMA OF MINORITIES IN TH E BALKANS
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Balkan states. This coupled with the effects of continuing irredentist 
claims, has led the nation-states to be exceptionally cautious towards the 
minorities.
The presence of minorities in its territory irritates the home state (the state 
which hosts minorities). It feels insecure because of a perception of 
challenge to its integrity a different ethnic population) on its historically 
claimed territories. To make matters worse, the minority might act to 
contribute to such insecurity. Acting at times as a friend of its mother state 
(the state to which the minority feels ethnically and historically attached 
to), the minority begins to be regarded by its home state as a foes or a 
potential surrogate. Such a situation in fact creates a vicious circle, where, 
the minority, defined in the "modern" nationalist sense, as a threat more 
and more joins the "nationalist game" its ultimate goal becoming accession 
to another state.
The home state is likely to develop under these circumstances a 
perception where it sees the minority as a threat to its territorial integrity. 
This perception, together with the tri-lateral relationship involving the 
minority, its home state and mother state exacerbates the situation. Home 
states have, therefore, chosen at many times to deal with the minorities in a 
crushing manner, however high the costs may be. This line of policy often 
aims the final elimination of the minority - through assimilation, physical 
extermination, deportation, cultural denials etc.
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3.1. THE DEFINING CRITERION FOR BALKAN MINORITIES
Every Balkan state established since 19th century -except for the two 
Yugoslavias in theory and the second Yugoslavia also in practice to an extent- 
was designed and destined to be a nation-state. The raison d'etre of a nation­
state is the nation per se, that actually possesses, reigns over and dominates its 
very state. The whole state structure outwardly exists to serve "the nation" 
which enjoys exclusive rights over the state mechanisms; i.e, the education 
system, bureaucracy, army etc. and also the social and economic basis of the 
state. In that sense, a minority in the Balkans is a group that does not belong to 
the nation, that is in control of the nation-state.
In each Balkan state, a definition of the nation has been synthesized through 
political history of that state. The criterion defining the identity of a particular 
nation should therefore give us hints about who belong to that nation. We 
could use this criterion in an exclusive manner to define who would not belong 
to that nation, therefore a potential minority. To put it bluntly, in a state, a 
minority is a group which -through historical experience- is deJBned to be out of 
, if not alien to the possessor nation of that nation-state. Even simpler is the 
following explanation; a minority is defined through the fact of not belonging 
to the majority.
CHAPTER ni: THE BALKAN MINORITIES
3.2. GREECE AND ITS MINORITIES
In 1985, Greece had a population of ;
"9.950.000...Modem Greece is a sum of a diversity of 
influences from different civilizations and peoples; the 
Roman, Byzantine and Ottoman Empires, merchants 
from the Near East, France, Venice and Italy, settlers and 
invaders from the Slavs, Albanians, Turks, Italians and 
British. While the majority of the population -perhaps 
95%- is ethnically Greek, there remain substantial, often 
unacknowledged and considerably Hellenicized 
minorities -Vlahs, Pomaks, Roma, Albanians, 
'Macedonians' and others. However the only minorities 
recognized by the government are those with a religious.
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rather than ethnic or cultural identity and even here 
treatment accorded to them is not always equal to that 
given to Greek citizens of the Orthodox Church" d
After its independence from the Ottoman Empire by the beginning of 19th 
century, Greece already possessed a sizable Albanian (Muslim and Greek- 
Orthodox) population. Continuous territorial enlargement to last till the end of 
W.W.II, the acquisition of the Dodoecanese, brought into Greece a larger 
ethnic diversity. The Vlahs of Pindus and Thessaly; Albanians of Epirus; the 
Slav Macedons and Jews of Macedonia; Turks, Pomaks and Roma of Macedo­
nia and Thrace as well as the Catholics and Muslims of the islands were all 
incorporated. When, for example, Aegean Macedonia came under Greek rule 
following the Balkan wars, the region had a population of 1.073.949, out of 
which only 240.019 were Orthodox Greeks, while a total of 326.426 was made 
up by the Orthodox Macedons, 289.973 by the Muslim Turks, 59. 560 by the 
Jews, 40.921 by the Muslim Macedons and the rest by a variety of people 
including Muslim Greeks, Circassians (Mongols), Muslim and Christian 
Albanians, Vlahs and Roma.2
Not feeling secure by the existence of minorities, which were far from being 
minorities on local basis, and worried about the dilution of the Greek character 
of the state, the Greek governments utilized various methods to minimize the 
existence of these minorities and by implication "potential risks". One way 
was voluntary assimilation. Offering education in Greek to those non-Greek 
speaking peoples of the Greek church, Greece managed to assimilate large 
numbers of especially Albanians, Vlahs, Macedons and Roma. Here, shared 
religion worked well especially in the case of the Vlahs to integrate these 
people -nearly to the fullest extent- into the Greek society.
Assimilation through use of force was a second one. Especially utilized with 
regards to the Slav Macedón minority during the inter-war and post-W.W.II 
periods, this policy was resorted to in the forms of bans on cultural activities, 
deportations, exiles, resettlement and various police measures. Such efforts 
succeeded in integrating some of the Macedons while silencing some others.
A third was the population exchanges. Bilateral agreements with Bulgaria and 
Turkey, the population exchanges of post-W.W.I resulted homogenizing the 
population of Macedonia to an extent and some other parts of Greece. In these 
exchanges, 50.000 to 70.000 Bulgarians and 390.000 Muslims/Turks left the
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Aegean Macedonia, the former for Bulgaria, and the latter for Turkey. 25.000 
Greeks from Bulgaria and a total of 1.200.000 Greek-Orthodox Christians from 
Turkey arrived in Greece in return for the exchange.^ Most of the new comers 
were settled in those areas of Greece, not strictly Greek in nature, such as 
Macedonia, to influence the population balance of such regions.
A fourth mechanism used by the Greek governments has been the denial of 
national identity. This policy becomes most pronounced in the attitude of the 
Greek government towards the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. Not being 
able to assimilate or get rid of the Turks and the Muslims of Western Thrace, 
Greece has tried to erode the ethnic consciousness of this population by 
denying its identity. Despite all the efforts to eradicate the minorities, today 
Greece is still home to substantial numbers of minority groups.'*
3.2.1. Turks, Pomaks, Roma of Western Thrace
Excluded from the population exchanges of 1920's by the virtue of the 
Lausanne Treaty, Western Thrace, by the census of 1928 had
"191.254 Turks...In 1981 census figures give a total of
110.000 belonging to religious minorities of whom some
60.000 are Turkish speaking Muslims, 30.000 Pomaks
20.000 Athingani (descendants of Christian heretics 
expelled from Asia Minor during Byzantine rule) or 
Roma Gypsies. However the Turkish Muslim sources 
claim a total of 100.000 to 120.000 Turkish speaking 
Muslims in Western Thrace and most observers between
100.000 and 120.000 Muslims out of a total population 
for Western Thrace of some 360.000 recorded in the 
census of 1981".5
Although the Lausanne Treaty guaranteed the Muslims in Western Thrace 
certain cultural and religious rights, this did not save them from discrimination 
imposed upon them by Greek government. Denial of identity and official 
discrimination have resulted in the emigration of large numbers of Muslims to 
Turkey. Thus the number of Muslims has shrunk in the last 70 years.
The efforts of the Greek government, however, resulted in a merger of 
identities. In the Balkans the Turkish and Islamic identities have long 
overlapped. Therefore, the denial of ethnic identity (be it Turkish, Roma or
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Pomak) as well as discrimination towards the Muslims by the virtue of their 
religion have increased inter-confessional solidarity and a merger of Pomaks 
and Romas into the Turkish community. This Turkish identity which also 
means a Muslim identity in the Balkan sense has acted as a magnet for the non- 
Turks of Western Thrace to such an extent that it has now become difficult to 
distinguish different Muslims of the region, most of whom see themselves as 
Turks. Being the sole Turkish/ Muslim minority in the Balkans whose rights 
are guarded by Turkey through the Lausanne Treaty, this community occupies 
a very special place in the eyes of the Turkish government. Despite this fact, 
however, the community still suffers from deep-rooted discrimination and 
violation of its guaranteed rights and is therefore a source of confiict for Turco- 
Greek relations.^
3.2.2. The Macedonians
The Macedons living in the Aegean Macedonia have been subject to 
continuous assimilation efforts by the Greek governments. The fact that a 
sizable Slavic community -identified with Bulgaria for a long time as Bulgari­
an- had remained in the Aegean Macedonia despite the population exchange 
between Greece and Bulgaria was a serious headache for Greece. In due 
course, the identity of these people, who now regarded themselves as 
Macedons rather than Bulgarians, was always denied by the Greek government.
"The position of the Slav minority worsened in the 
period 1936-41 under the Metaxas regime which viewed 
the minority as a danger to Greece's security and large 
numbers of Macedonians were interned from the border 
regions with Yugoslavia. Night schools were opened up 
to teach adult Slavs the Greek language".^
Greece called the Macedonians first Slav Macedons to cut their links with the 
Bulgarian identity and later Slavophone Greeks as it tried to eradicate the 
Slavic consciousness among these people. The Macedonian participation in the 
Greek civil war on the communist side resulted in further antagonisms. 
Mistrust towards this community caused a new wave of expulsion to 
Yugoslavia following the defeat of the communists. In the post-war period, the 
Greek government continued its efforts to assimilate the now smaller Macedón 
minority or simply mutilate it. Despite these efforts, a community of circa
50.000 Macedons still exists in the most remote parts of Greek Macedonia as a
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potential source of conflict between the Greek government and the newly 
independent Macedonian state.®
3.2.3. TheVlahs
The Vlahs actually a nomadic Latinophone people dispersed all around the 
peninsula including Greece have lacked a well defined national identity, except 
for late 19th century effort by the Romanian government to recruit them into 
the Romanian identity. "Many Vlahs have identified themselves with Greeks 
due to having received Greek education in Greek schools and took a leading 
role in the struggle for Greek independence...there is no apparent nationalist or 
separatist feeling among the Vlahs of Greece... -since 1980's the situation has 
improved as the Greek government apparently recognizes that the Vlahs, unlike 
the Turks or Macedonians constitute no threat, real or potential to the Greek 
state" .9 Due to high assimilation, the exact number of Vlahs in Greece is not to 
be determined so easily.
3.2.4. The Albanians
"There is very little information about the Albanian 
minority which remained in Greece after the founding of 
the Albanian state in 1913. Most of these Albanians 
were Orthodox by religion although there were Muslim 
Chamuris in northern Greece until immediately after 
W.W.II (they were deported to Albania then due to their 
war time collaboration with the Italians). Meanwhile, the 
Orthodox Albanians, similarly to the other Orthodox 
minorities, tended to become Hellenicized due to Greek 
control of the education system".^*
As in the case of the Vlahs, shared religion and common church must have 
played a significant role in the assimilation process of the Orthodox
Albanians. 12
3.2.5. Less Numerous Minorities
The small community of Jews who have survived the Holocaust, the Orthodox 
Roma (who just like the Orthodox Albanians and Vlahs have been also 
assimilated into mainstream Greek culture), the Catholics (as remnants of
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Venetian and Italian presence over the Greek islands) might be cited as proofs 
to the ethnic, cultural diversity of Greece despite two centuries of indubious 
efforts to create an ethnically homogenous nationd^
3.3. ALBANIA AND ITS MINORITIES
Because of the particular nature of Albanian nationalism that did not make use 
of religious cleavages but united Albanian speaking peoples of all faiths, the 
Albanian state established in 1913 included Albanians of Muslim (Sunni & 
Bektashi) and Christian (Orthodox and Catholic) f a i t h s . " A t  the end of 
W.W.II, over 70 % of the population was Muslim; approximately 17 % - 
including ethnic Greeks- belonged to the Orthodox church mainly in the south 
and central areas; and about 10% to the Roman Catholic Church in the 
mountains no r t h" . The  wide definition of national identity arching over 
religious differences has minimized the possibility of religious minorities in 
Albania. Albania is the only country in the Balkans where one does not 
encounter minorities in the religious sense. In that case the only sizable 
minority in Albania is the Greek speaking Orthodox community living mainly 
in the south.
3.3.1. Greeks in Albania
The particular nature of Albanian nationalism does not mean that it is free of 
antagonisms towards non-Albanians. If anything. The Greek minority in 
Albania has particularly suffered from such antagonism. No recent statistics 
have to date been published on the number of the Greek minority and the 
others. "According to the 1955 census, it (the Greek community) then 
represented 2.94 % of thé population. In the 1961 census, 95% of the 
population was given as ethnically Albanian".Although in Greece the Greek- 
Orthodox Church has been able to integrate the Orthodox Albanians into 
mainstream culture, integration through common religion has not been 
accomplished in Albania. The Albanian Orthodox Church has failed to 
assimilate the Greeks, because they possessed a church tradition older and 
more rooted than that of the Albanian Church. In addition to this failure, the 
official ban on religion in 1967 has helped the Greek community to keep itself 
intact by eliminating further encroachments by the Albanian Church towards 
the Greeks.
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Today the Greek government claims the Greek community in Albania to 
number around 400.000, while Albanian authorities put it at 50.000. The 
Greek claim is based on membership to the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of 
Albania which uses Greek for the services, but does not necessarily include 
Greeks only. This phenomenon is in fact a major source of confusion where 
Albanian speaking Orthodox people attend this predominantly Greek church, 
and are therefore identifiable as Greeks. Whatever the size, the Greek 
community has suffered from serious discriminations including a ban on use of 
Greek names and the Greek language, the trait which distinguishes the 
community most from the Albanians.!^
The issue of the Greeks in Albania has continuously strained the relations 
between Greece and Albania. Today, Albania continues to deny the rights of 
the Greeks, while Greece seems to make irredentist claims to Southern Albania 
(Northern Epirus in official Greek terminology).
3.3.2. Other Minorities in Albania
In addition to the linguistically identifiable Greek minority, Albania has a 
number of other minority communities. Small communities of Macedons, 
Pomaks (both living in the tiny strip of the so-called Macedonia of nineteenth 
century allocated to Albania following the partition of the region at the end of 
the Balkan wars); Montenegrins in the north; Vlahs on the mountains; as well 
as the Roma and Jews can be cited among the smaller minority groups of 
Albania. Together with the Greeks, these communities make up 5% of 
Albania's population which is now around 3.2 million.
3.4. CROATIA AND ITS MINORIHES
3.4.1. Serbs in Croatia and the Krajrna
The largest minority in Croatia is the Serbs, who make up approximately 12% 
of the population, which now stands about 4.6 million. Most of Croatia, also 
Transylvania, Hungary and Slovenia were under Ottoman domination from 
1530's to 1699 when the Ottoman Empire was forced to cede these provinces to 
the Habsburgs in accordance with the treaty of Karlowitz. Those sections of 
Croatia under Ottoman domination used to be known as Ottoman Croatia. 
After its incorporation into the Habsburg domains, Croatia formed a buffer 
zone between the two Empires. The Habsburgs promoted in this buffer zone
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the settlement of Orthodox refugees who were fleeing the Ottomans after their 
abortive uprisings. The Habsburg policy was designed to minimize the effects 
of Ottoman raids into their territories by forming fighting units troops to face 
the Ottomans and even to establish counter attacks into the Ottoman lands.
This special administrative division known as Krajina (meaning border in 
Serbo-Croatian) by the Habsburgs was given autonomy in its internal affairs 
and saved from incorporation into Croat territories. Krajina roughly encircled 
Bosnia and therefore turned into a magnet for repeated waves of Serbs coming 
out of the Ottoman Empire. The financial, military and administrative 
privileges granted to the Serbs did have a certain role in inciting the population 
flow. Krajina was to be integrated into the Habsburg Empire only by late 19th 
century, even then its predominantly Serbian character was to dominate the 
region. During W.W.II Krajina was incorporated into the Ustasha Croat state. 
This development not only ignited a wave of terror against the Serbs in the area 
but also drove Krajina into a chaotic situation with Serbiabn retaliations gaginst 
the local Serbs. Fascist terror carried out by the Ustashas was countered by the 
rising communist movement in the Yugoslav lands. Thus Tito's partisans 
found natural ground for support in the Krajina. These atrocities left a 
memorable scar in Croatia's social memory.20
After W.W.II Krajina together with Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia was brought 
together to form Croatia proper as one of the six constituent republics of the 
newly established Yugoslavia. In this new structure the cultural and political 
rights of the Krajina Serbs were recognized.
The well-known repercussions of Yugoslavia's dissolution resulted in a putsch 
among the Serbs of Croatia to join a Greater Serbia. The conflict in Krajina 
soon assumed a violent character as the Serbs there endeavored to break away 
from Croatia, on the grounds that the new Croat state would fail to recognize 
their distinctive historical position and rights. The JNA (Jugoslav National 
Army) became involved.21 Fighting came to an end when the Serbs occupied 
and ethnically cleared the Krajina composed of the former military regions of 
Croatia and Slavonia, namely, Lika, Kordun, and Eastern Slavonia.22 The 
policy of ethnic cleansing carried out in these territories making up more than 
1/3 of Croatia had resulted in the extermination or expulsion of large number of 
Croats from the Krajina, which is now a self-proclaimed Serbian Republic. 
On the other hand, the UN Peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR) deployed to 
Croatia to maintain peace there have exacerbated the situation. The forces
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were stationed in Croatia at a very inappropriate moment, when all the fighting 
had ceased.23 Thus their positioning in Croatia only froze the situation by 
making the Serb territorial gains, in a way, permanent. This is why today the 
Croat government insists that the UN peacekeeping forces withdraw.2+
3.4.2. Italians in Croatia
Though only a small community now (circa 20. 000) and settled mostly in the 
Istrian peninsula and the Dalmatian towns of Rijeka and Zadar, the Italians in 
Croatia have an important place and, therefore, a disproportionate influence on 
the life of the country. The community has been a symbol of Italian interest 
and presence on the Adriatic. Most of the community's prestige and wealth is 
an accumulation of a valuable past. Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia the 
Italians, not relating so deeply to the war in Croatia -together with much of the 
rest of the Dalmatia- have tried to avoid the general conflict in the country by 
distancing themselves from it. Autonomist tendencies arising in Istria and 
Dalmatia are only signs of such an attitude.
3.4.3. The "Yugoslavs" of Croatia
In addition to the Krajina Serbs there is a number of Serbs living in the major 
cities of Croatia, mainly in Zagreb, who migrated to Croatia as a result of huge 
labor discharge of the agricultural areas, a process initiated by post-war 
economic collectivization and restructuring efforts in former Yugoslavia. These 
Serbs are very much integrated in to the mainstream Croatian affairs. 
Similarly, there is also a good number of Muslims (around 100.000), Slovenes, 
Albanians and Macedonians who, may be called as "Yugoslavs" in Croatia and 
who are again unlikely to create any serious problems to the country.26
3.4.4. Slavonia, a Microcosm of Central Europe
Slavonia, now a part of Croatia, historically had a separate existence from 
Croatia proper. Lying between Croatia proper to the west and historical Srem, 
Васка and Baranja to the east, it is surrounded by the Drava and the Danube 
rivers. Slavonia, just like Baranja, its neighbor to the northeast has been and is 
home to various ethnic groups. Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian/ Ukraini­
an, German and Jewish inhabitants are examples to the ethnic mix of these two 
regions.
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The Habsburgs formulated and carried out a policy of population transfers to 
repopulate those territories recovered from the Ottomans. Starting vv^ ith the 
17th and 18th century various groups from all around the Danubian basin were 
moved to Slavonia and Baranja, and also to the Banat, Васка and the 
Vojvodina which therefore have similar ethnic make up to these regions. 
Among these the Germans in the area were deported to Germany following 
W.W.II, while the Jews were annihilated during the same period. Meanwhile 
the remaining communities have been influenced by the war fought in Croatia 
since the dissolution of Yugoslavia began. The Hungarians, the largest of these 
communities negatively influenced by the war and especially by the Serbian 
atrocities have expressed their discomfort with and disapproval of, the 
situation.
3.5. SLOVENIA AND ITS MINOmTIES
Slovenia, located in the northwestern end of the peninsula is a country 
peripheral to the inter-Balkan affairs. It has the smallest (1.6 million) but at the 
same time the most homogenous population in the Balkans.27 The Catholic 
Slovenes make up more than 90% of the country's population. The rest of the 
population is made up by the "Yugoslavs" and a small Italian community, a 
reminder of the past Italian presence in the country.^« The "Yugoslavs" in 
Slovenia, settled in major towns and the industrial basins, are integrated into 
the economic, social and cultural life of the country.
Interestingly, Slovenia is the only Balkan country that possesses a minority in a 
non-Balkan state. The Habsburg provinces of Steiermark, Carynthia and 
Camiola which were divided between Italy, Austria and the first Yugoslavia, 
following W.WT hadflarge Slovene populations. Today Slovene populations 
living in Austria and Italy are in a relatively comfortable position though their 
rights are not fully recognized by their host states.29
3.6. MACEDONIA AND ITS MINORITIES
Prior to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, "the population of the Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia was 1.912.257 according to the census of 1981 of which there 
were 1.281.195 Macedonians, 377.226 Albanians".3o If one adds to this, the 
Turkish, Muslim, Roma, Vlah and Serb minorities and also a few lesser 
minority groups the ethnic diversity of Macedonia can be easily observed. In 
that case the latter cited groups make up more than 20% of the local
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population. Together with the strong Albanian community the "minorities" in 
Macedonia in fact constitute an almost statistical majority.3* This, however, is 
in fact difficult to determine because Macedonia is a typical case where statisti­
cal data referring to the make up of the population vary depending upon the 
identity of the data gatherer. For instance, sources on the percentage of the 
Albanians in Macedonia cite figures from 21% to 45%.32
3.6.1. Albanians in Macedonia
"The ethnic Albanians, by far the largest minority in the (ex) Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia, live in compact settlements in the west of the republic bordering 
Albania, the north-west bordering on the predominantly Albanian province of 
Kosovo/a, and in Skopje where they make up over 14% of the population. 
They constitute a majority of the population in many western a r e a s " . T h e  
predominantly Muslim Albanians in Macedonia are culturally very similar to, 
and maintain close links with, those Albanians in Kosovo/a. '^^
Treated earlier as a nationality in rump Yugoslavia but now down to the 
minority status, the Albanians of Macedonia seem dissatisfied with the 
situation in the new Macedonia. Their previously existing claims about 
discrimination within Macedonia are exacerbated by this new situation. "In 
1989, the Macedonian authorities amended the Republic's constitution so that 
the Socialist Republic of Macedonia was defined as a 'nation-state' of Macedo­
nian people instead of the previous formulation which defined it as a 'state of 
the Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish nationalities. This 
change reflected the growing uneasiness of the Macedonian authorities in the 
face of Albanian nationalism...which has manifested itself in a more aggressive 
Macedonian nationalism" In fact despite efforts by the Macedonian 
government to win back the Albanians by various concessions, they tend to 
keep out of any serious rapprochement unless their rights under the previous 
constitution are restored and also they enjoy rights as one of the constituent 
nations of Macedonia.36
3.6.2. Turks in Macedonia
Official figures put the number of Turks in Macedonia at 86.000 (3.5 % of the 
population). With the coming to an end of the Ottoman rule in Macedonia 
elsewhere in the Balkans, most of the Turks left Macedonia for Turkey. Being 
landholders -the previous timars having been metamorphosized into hereditary
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chifliks- the Turks in Macedonia had always enjoyed a prestigious position. 
Continuing immigration to Turkey as well as land distribution programs 
especially during the second Yugoslavia, however, have diminished Turkish 
influence to a large extent.
Another reason for the decline in Turkish influence is the process through 
which the Albanians in Macedonia have distinguished themselves from the 
Turks. As has been touched upon earlier, in the Balkan context, Islam and 
Ottoman Turks have been associated for a long time to such an extent that 
Islamization was identified with becoming Ottoman and Turkish (not in the 
ethnic sense). Therefore, for a long time the identity of the Muslim Albanians 
coincided with that of the Muslim Turks. The Albanian identity finally broke 
away from the Muslim Turkish identity with the emergence of Turkish and 
Albanian nationalisms by early 20th cen t u r yHowever ,  the new Albanian 
national identity found fertile grounds mostly in Albania proper, and the 
association with Turkish identity continued among the Albanian Diaspora. As 
late as 195O's large number, of Albanian speaking Muslims in Macedonia 
declared themselves as Turks.
"Lately, the direction of this association has shown signs of change. With the 
Albanians comprising the majority of the Muslim population in Macedonia and 
the Turks a minority, the trend among some Albanians has been to assimilate 
the Turkish identity into a larger body of Albanian i d e n t i t y H o w e v e r  the 
strength of Turkish Islamic identity has proven strong and coherent enough to 
resist such efforts if not totally discard them. Such phenomena points to some 
kind of uneasy situation between the Turks and the Albanians of Macedonia.
Being one of the only two Turkish minorities in the Balkans (the other is the 
Turks of Romania) that has enjoyed full and inviolated cultural and political 
rights in the post-W.W.II period, the Turks in Macedonia have been generally 
on good terms with the Macedonians. As the third largest ethnic group in 
Macedonia, the Turks are in fact an element of balance between the majority 
Macedonians and the minority Albanians.
3.6.3. The Muslim Macedonians
Like the Albanians the Muslim Macedonians (about 3.5 % of the local 
population) have also regarded themselves as Turks for a very long time.
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"This apparent confusion over identity of the different 
Muslim groups shows again , that in the Balkans religion 
has often been of paramount importance in ethnic 
differentiation. This is further illustrated by the Muslim 
Macedonians, known as Torbeshes, Pomaks, Poturs.
Similarly to the Pomaks in Bulgaria, these Muslims often 
showed in the past greater identification with fellow 
Muslims, especially Turks".4o
Descendants of Slavic speaking groups converted to Islam by 17th century, the 
Muslim Macedonians also face a form of Albanian Muslim nationalism due to 
"the penetration of Albanian nationalism into this community by way of, 
among other things, Albanian speaking hodzhas"." !^ The Muslim Macedonian 
view concerning assimilation into the Albanian identity has been expressed by 
the community itself with the term "quiet assimilation". The Muslim 
Macedonians are under a real cross fire at the ihoment; possessing a deep 
rooted Turkish identity which is challenged by a fervent Albanian identity as 
well as the Macedonian government that stresses the Slavic roots of these
Muslims .^ 2
3.6.4. The Serbs
The Serbs in Macedonia constitute around 5% of the total population.'^  ^
basically descend from those Serbs settled in Macedonia in the inter-war period 
as a result of the efforts of the first Yugoslav government to Serbianize/ 
colonize the region. As a Serbian minority living out of but next to Serbia, the 
community bears the potential of -similar to the cases in Croatia and Bosnia- 
drawing Macedonia into a bloody conflict with the new Yugoslavia. Here, 
from the viewpoint of the minority, the issue of joining a Greater Serbia; and in 
the eyes of Serbia, preserving the safety of a Serbian community could ignite 
conflicts. The fact that so far such concerns -except for a few negligible cases- 
have not been expressed should be a serious consolation for Macedonia.^
3.6.5. The Roma
Constituting 4% of Macedonia's population, the Roma in Macedonia are the 
most privileged Gypsy community all over the Balkans.'^  ^ Enjoying extensive 
cultural and political rights, the Roma community deserves special attention in 
that respect. Macedonia is the only state in the Balkans where the Roma
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category has been included into the censuses. Similar to the Muslim 
Macedonians, the Roma have also tended to identify themselves as Turks and 
are offered at the moment an alternative Albanian identity.
3.6.6. TheVlahs
Just as in Greece, so in Macedonia it is difficult to obtain exact numbers 
regarding the Vlah community. Traditionally a pastoral community of the 
Orthodox faith, the Vlahs in Macedonia tend to identify themselves as 
Macedonians with the help of shared religion and uniform education process, 
once they are urbanized. "Successive censuses have shown a gradual decline in 
their numbers in Macedonia from 8669 in 1953 to 6392 in 1982 and it appears 
that they are becoming assimilated by the majority Macedonian population".
3.7. BULGARIA AND ITS MINORITIES
One of the first Balkan lands to be captured by the Ottomans, as early as the 
mid 14th century- Bulgaria was densely populated by Turkic tribes transferred 
to the Balkans from Anatolia. Today with a population of 9 million, and 
despite continuous Turkish-Muslim emigration to Turkey since 1878, Bulgaria 
has the largest Turkish minority in the Balkans.'^^
3.7.1. Turks in Bulgaria
As there have been no official figures for the total numbers of ethnic minorities 
in Bulgaria since 1965, it is hard to estimate the number of Turks in Bulgaria. 
The number of ethnic Turks varies between 900.000 and 1.5 million depending 
upon the source. In either case, the Turks constitute a sizable segment of the 
Bulgarian population and the majority in various areas of the country. Despite 
large scale emigrations since 1878, particularly during and after the Balkan 
wars, as well as in the 1950's and 80's, the number of the Turks in Bulgaria has 
been steady due to the high birth-rate.
The Turkish minority in Bulgaria did possess certain cultural rights under the 
Bulgarian kingdom and during the inter-war period.'** The Turks were better 
off in 1947 with a new constitution declaring the Turks together with the 
Gypsies as a 'national' minority, a position which entitled them to special rights 
and privileges. "However this recognition was circumscribed by a general 
reservation about the very idea of minorities in Bulgaria and the 1971
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constitution...(which) makes no specific references to ethnic minorities, cited 
them simply as 'citizens of non-Bulgarian origin' Bulgaria's fears about the
Turkish minority eventually becoming a constituent people of the country 
owing to its high population growth rate. This led to the policy of suppression 
of cultural institutions, abolition of education in Turkish and a ban on Turkish 
press. The situation got even worse with the well known assimilation 
campaign between 1984 and 1989. Attempts to eradicate the Turkish identity 
by banning Islamic practices and the Turkish language, however, proved 
futile.
Coinciding with the fall of communism, the Bulgarian government endeavored 
to restore the previous rights of the Turkish community. The forced 
assimilation policy that had resulted in increased tension between Turkey and 
Bulgaria caused a mass exodus of Turks and Muslims from Bulgaria. 
Gradually however as the situation changed, tension was reduced, and more 
than half of the 300.000 expelled Turks-Musllms returned to Bulgaria.^» 
Today, with political and increasing cultural rights, the large Turkish 
community in Bulgaria is a main actor in the public life of the country. One of 
the significant parties, Movements for Freedoms and Rights (HÖH), a covert 
partner in the former government is predominantly Turkish for example as 
relations between the Bulgarians and the Turks, despite sporadic mutual 
national outbursts are on the way to improve.^i
3.7.2. The Bulgarian Muslims (Pomaks)
"The Bulgarian Muslims, usually called by the originally 
derogatory term 'Pomaks', are a religious minority. They 
are Slav-Bulgarians who speak Bulgarian as their 
mother tongue but whose religion and culture are 
Islamic. They are estimated to number in excess of 
250.000...and live in compact settlements in the 
mountainous regions of the Rhodope mountains in south­
western and southern Bulgaria and down the Mesta 
valley in the Pirin region". 2^
During the Ottoman era where under the Millet system membership to one of 
the religious communities defined one's identity, Islamkation in the Balkan 
sense meant loosing one’s identity. So when various Slavo-Bulgars accepted 
Islam they also became Turks and ceased to be Bulgarians. This Turkish
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identity has in fact been so strongly established that it has survived to our 
date.53 The assimilation campaign targeting the Pomaks started as early as 
1971. Alarmed by high population growth among the Pomaks, the 
governments at the time used various measures such as forced name changes, 
prohibition of religious practices and public discrimination towards the 
Pomaks. These measures, however, only strengthened the identities possessed 
by the Pomaks and enhanced the link between the Pomak and the Turkish 
identities. Increased solidarity with the Turks to face the Bulgarian 
government has produced a particular result that today only as opposed to the 
Turks the Pomaks are still Pomaks, whereas with regards to the outsiders they 
are now Turks.
3.7.3. The Roma
The phenomena of multiple identities -as is the case with various Balkan 
communities- is more apparent in the case of the Muslim Roma of Bulgaria.
"There is very little information available on the Roma 
minority in Bulgaria estimated to number over 
550.000...while Bulgaria has made determined efforts to 
raise the living standards and educational opportunities 
of the Roma minority, the authorities have been equally 
firm in denying them the right to preserve their own 
national identity and culture". 54
As a result of the Balkan wide trend to see Turk and Islam as identical, the 
non-recognition of the Roma has led to their strengthened self-identification 
with the Turks. Assimilation campaigns are known to have targeted the Roma 
as early as 1965. With the conclusion of such campaigns, the Roma have 
slowly started to organize themselves into political bodies. Their self- 
identification towards the outer world which is now Turkish, like the Pomaks, 
is reflected by the fact that most of the Roma seem to support the predominant­
ly Turkish Movement of Rights and Freedoms (HOH).55
3.7.4. The Macedonians
The Slavs living in Macedonia used to be known as Bulgarians due to the 
shared language, religion and political experience as late as the Balkan wars. 
After the partition of Macedonia, the introduction of nation-state mechanisms
40
in Greece and Yugoslavia to deplete the Bulgarian identity, coupled with 
Bulgaria's failure to perpetuate the Bulgarian identity resulted in a gradual 
erosion in the Bulgarian identity in Macedonia.^^
The distinct Macedón identity coming out as a communist initiative found 
fertile grounds first among the desperately repressed Slavs-Bulgarians of 
Macedonia. The strength of the Macedonian identity came to such a tide that, 
following W.W.II, in accordance with Tito's initiative for a federal Balkan 
state, even Bulgaria -once an ardent supporter of the Bulgarian identity in 
Macedonia- threw in full support for the creation of a Macedonian state for the 
Macedonians. Bulgaria went so far as to offer the accession of its tiny share of 
Macedonia (the Pirin Macedonia which Bulgaria had gained following the 
Balkan wars) into the Yugoslav Macedón Republic. Though this did not 
materialize, Bulgaria recognized the "Macedonians", the inhabitants of the 
Pirin Macedonia, as a minority and accorded to them minority rights. 
However, following Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Communist block due to 
the dispute between Tito and Stalin, the initiative was dropped by Bulgaria. 
Nearly overnight, Bulgaria renounced all the rights it had accorded to the 
'Macedonian minority'. Even then "the census of 1965 recorded 187.789 
Macedonians , over 95% of whom lived in the Pirin region where they made up 
63.8% of the population".Bulgaria's continuous denial of the Macedonian 
identity and police measures, when required, outlawing the Macedonian 
identity in all contexts have eradicated the Macedonian identity to a great 
extent. So that by the census of 1965 only 8750 people declared themselves as 
Macedonians.
Bulgaria's denial of a Macedonian nation and an Macedón minority still 
continues. It is interesting to' note that following the dissolution of ex- 
Yugoslavia, Bulgaria immediately recognized the new Macedonian state, but 
has made it clear that it will never recognize a Macedonian nation, let alone 
recognize a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria, an issue which is still a political 
taboo in Bulgaria.
3.7.5. Other Minorities in Bulgaria
The Vlahs living in parts of the Pirin Macedonia as well as in northern Bulgaria 
are estimated to be around a few ten thousands. The fate of the Vlahs in 
Bulgaria has been similar to those in Greece and Macedonia. Common 
religion, urbanization cutting the link with the pastoral way of life that forms
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an essential part of the Vlah identity, lack of nationalistic orientation have 
resulted in the assimilation of large number of Vlahs into the Bulgarian
identity.58
Small number of Albanians as remnants of the Ottoman trade route extending 
from Varna to Dubrovnik; Armenians settled in Bulgaria after the 
establishment of the Ottoman rule; and Jews as left-over of the Bulgarian 
Jewish community who were never surrendered in to the Nazis during W.W.II 
thanks to the efforts of the Bulgarian king of the time and the Bulgarian people, 
but who nevertheless emigrated to Israel, may be cited as the less numerous 
minorities in Bulgaria. 59
3.8. ROMANIA AND ITS MINORITIES
3.8.1. The Magyars, the "Minority" in Romania
According to the census of 1992, there is a total of 26 officially recognized 
minorities in Romania. Among these minorities which vary in size, the 
Magyars are in a very awkward position. The community now numbers around 
1.6 million, according to official figures, making up 7.1% of the population. 
While the Hungarian government puts it at 2.000.000.50 The Magyars in 
Romania are not only the biggest minority but also, in the actual sense the only 
minority in Romania.5*
Populating the western Romanian regions of the Banat and the Transylvania, 
they are a blend of the Szeklers (descendants of the Avars who settled around 
the Danube around 7th century) and the later Magyars arriving into the 
Carpathian basin around 11th century.52 Following the Mohacs war, the 
Ottomans established control over the Banat and the Transylvania, possessed 
by the Magyar kingdom till then, but gave administrative autonomy to the local 
Magyar dynasty and rulers. With the end of the Ottoman rule, Transylvania 
and later the Banat were incorporated into the Habsburg Empire. Habsburg 
rule over what is now western Romania ran uninterrupted till the end of W.W.I, 
only to be modified by the establishment of the Ausgleicb of 1867 through 
which Transylvania and the Banat were left under the jurisdiction of the 
Hungarian crown of the kingdom.53 Through this entire period the Magyars 
enjoyed total monopoly over the cultural and economical affairs in the region, 
whose population and rural areas were heavily Romanian in character. The 
situation started to change when following the peace treaties ending W.W.I,
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Transylvania and 2/3 of the Banat were given to the Romanian state. The 
Fascist Hungarian state of W.W.II which annexed Northern Transylvania, an 
area most distinctively Hungarian as opposed to other regions of western 
Romania, proved short-lived. The restoration of pre-war borders after W.W.II 
meant that a substantial Magyar minority would remain in Romania.
The Tirgu-Mures Autonomous Region designed for the Magyar majority in the 
center of Transylvania, formed in early the early 50's was in fact bom out of 
inter-block political considerations. It was thought that by giving cultural 
autonomy to the Magyars in Transylvania the relations between Hungary and 
Romania -the situation of which caused major headaches for Moscow- might 
be improved. However, the project had a short life due to rising Romanian 
nationalism; Romania's fears that the region could secede from Romania; and 
Romania's more vocal opposition to Soviet dominated Comintern policies. The 
termination of the project was to be followed by increased problems. Cultural 
and political rights the Magyars had enjoyed till then were simply violated.^ 
Increased discrimination towards the Magyars brought the Hungarian 
government into the play. The unrest of the Magyar minority grew in intensity, 
so much so that the end of the Ceausescu regime came with mass revolts and 
the demonstrations organized by the Magyars in western Romania which had a 
predominantly Magyar character after that.^s
With the fall of the communist regime, the Magyars organized themselves into 
the Democratic Federation of Romanian Hungarians (RMDSZ) to press for 
their rights. The fact that Magyars still constitute a majority in central 
Transylvania and substantial minorities elsewhere in western Romania forms 
an essential part of the conflict between this minority and the Romanian 
govemment.^^
The Magyar-Rumanian dispute is exacerbated by the religious cleavages. As 
opposed to the Rumanians who are Orthodox, the Magyars are divided into the 
Protestant (45% of the total) the Catholic (40% of the total ) and the Unitarian 
and other minor Protestant churches.^^ The Magyar minority of the Protestant 
faith is the largest such minority in the Balkans. The religious dimension of the 
cleavage continues to have a determining impact on the course of relations.
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3.8.2. Germans in Romania
German population of Transylvania and the Banat settled into the region in 
accordance with the Habsburg policies of colonization and repopulation. The 
Saxons (a word meaning masters in medieval German) arriving in the region as 
landowners and urban dwellers dominated much of the political and economic 
life in the area -together with the Magyars- throughout the Habsburg period as 
they were of the ruling elite. It was only after the land distribution programs of 
the inter-war period and the mass deportation to which they were subjected 
following W.W.II through which large numbers of the German speaking 
population was removed from western Romania as well as northern Yugoslavia 
due to war time collaborations with the Nazi invaders that the Saxon influence 
ebbed.
Today only a population of 110.000 remains in the country as the remnants of 
a once stark minority (.5% of Romania's population) Like the Magyars, the 
Germans are also divided into various churches, with the Evangelicans and the 
Catholics constituting large communities among them. Their religion is one of 
the main factors differentiating them from the Rumanian majority. The fact 
that it is a small minority with no secessionist aspirations has guaranteed this 
community is relatively comfortable security, particularly when compared to 
that of the Magyars with whom the Saxons share similar historical position. 
Today the minority enjoys full cultural and political rights.
3.8.3. The Roma
Official statistics give the Roma figure around 1.8% (409.723) of the 
population.^® However the Roma and various third party sources claim that 
around half of world's Roma population lives in Hungary and Romania, and a 
substantial part of that in Romania. Therefore, it appears plausible to assume 
that the Roma figure should be well above the official numbers. As in 
Bulgaria, also in Romania, the officially recognized Roma have not been 
granted their cultural and political rights. Assimilation into main stream 
Romanian culture could be one reason why the Roma population might be 
actually higher than the official figures given.
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3.8.4. The Muslims (Turks & Tatars )
Unlike most of the other Ottoman territories in the Balkans, the Romanian 
principalities were never placed under direct Ottoman rule. Therefore neither 
colonization nor conversions took place in the Principalities. By the time the 
principalities gained larger autonomy in 1812 on the way to independence, 
there was not substantial Muslim populations in these former Ottoman vassal 
states. Even then in accordance with the treaties signed to declare the 
principalities autonomous, the Muslim population of the towns and the 
garrisons was stipulated to leave by the treaties. That is why the Muslim 
Turkish population in Romania is confined to the Dobrudja, a land strip 
sandwiched between the Black Sea and the Danube historically never a part of 
the principalities. Like most of the other Balkan territories Dobrudja had a 
significant Turkish Muslim population at the time when it was ceded to the 
new Romanian state by the Ottomans despite the fact that Rumanians did not 
constitute a majority. The Muslims in Dobrudja, mostly wealthy landowners 
on the fertile plains, therefore, became a minority in the Romanian state.
The Muslims in Romania are divided into two categories, the Turks and the 
Tatars. The Turks (around 30.000) are direct descendants of the Ottomans, and 
the Tatars descendants of the Crimean Tatars settled into Dobrudja from the 
18th century onwards.^^ Now numbering 30.000, the Tatars settled mostly in 
Dobrudja fleeing their homes in the Crimea and the Ukrainian plains after these 
regions were turned over the Russians by the Ottomans.72 Today both the Turks 
and the Tatars enjoy full cultural and political rights in Romania, just as all the 
other minorities except r the Magyars.
3.8.5. Other Minorities in Romania
As a late comer into Romanian union and a low-lying natural passage from the 
Balkans into the Ukrainian steppes further north, Dobrudja is home to various 
minorities in addition to the Turks and the Tatars. The Bulgarians in southern 
Dobrudja, which for instance form such a bone of contention that southern 
Dobrudja has changed hands three times in twentieth century between Romania 
and Bulgaria, are one of the largest communities in that region. Various other 
communities, none exceeding a few ten thousands, such as the Greeks, 
remnants of the Phanariote Greeks who once dominated Romania from 1721 to 
1821; Armenians, the 'merchant peoples' of the Ottomans who also made their 
way also into Romania; Vlahs, who arrived by late 19th century from all
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around the Balkans south of the Danube as a direct result of the official policies 
pursued by the Romanian government to disseminate Romanian national 
ideology among this Latinophone population; and the Gagauz, Orthodox Turks 
whose homeland is the in environs of the Danubian delta may be cited as 
examples of the ethnic diversity of the country.
In addition, the Ruthenians/ Ukraimans (around 70.000) of northern Bukovina, 
living next to Ukraine, form the largest Slavic minority.^^ The Serbs of the 
Banat together with the Slovaks, Czechs, Poles and Russians, none of which 
exceeds a few ten thousands may be counted as examples of other Slavic 
minorities.
There is today only a handful of Jews in Romania. The Romanian Jews were 
one of the largest Jewish communities in Europe prior to W.W.II and made up 
around 10% of the local population. A bulk of the inter-war population had 
arrived into Romania, by late 19th century from the north, fleeing Russian 
pogroms. Forbidden to own property by law, the new comers established 
themselves as financiers and professionals in the, urban centers. By W.W.I, 
like the Saxons and the Magyars in the West, the Jews in the east of the 
country enjoyed a monopoly over most of the economic life. The grievances 
towards this "alien" community were successfully manipulated by the Nazis to 
such an extent that the Romanian Jews were exterminated en masse at the 
hands of the Nazis and their local accomplices.
3.9. MINORITIES IN THE NEW YUGOSLAV FEDERATION
The new Yugoslav Federation that consists of two federal republics, and two 
so-called autonomous regions, whose autonomous status has been truncated in 
the late 1980s is ethnically colorful even by Balkan standards.
3.9.1 Serbia and Its Minorities
During the formation of the 2nd Yugoslavia, the two largest communities that 
were not given their own constituent states were the Albanians, the Magyars. 
Those two communities, especially the Albanians, who made up a majority in 
Kosovo/a therefore pushed their way for republican status with more 
constitutional and legal rights. With the adoption of the new decentralizing 
constitution of 1974, the Albanian and the Magyar dreams were fulfilled. The
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autonomous regions were created and delegated so much power that on the 
actual level they became as influential as the constituent republics. The 
mechanisms allowing these provinces to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Serbia, to which they were still legally tied, but blocking Serbia from doing it 
the other way around gave comfort to the Albanians and the Magyars but 
resentment for the Serbs, who saw themselves as greatly underprivileged in 
these two "provinces of their own". The tide of Serbian nationalism during late 
1980s, based on claims of discrimination against the Serbs in Kosovo/a while 
dreaming a Greater Serbia that would also include Kosovo/a; and Albanian 
populations' claims to larger autonomy, exacerbated the already worsening 
relations between the Serbs and the Albanians. The rise of Serbian nationalism 
resulted in abolishing the autonomy of Kosovo/a, and as well the Vojvodina 
under duress of the central government and the JNA.^^
3.9.2. Albanians and the Situation in Kosovo/a
Regarded by Serbian nationalists as part of the "Old Serbia" and an inalienable 
part of the Serbian history, Kosovo/a is today populated heavily by Muslim 
Albanians who constitute absolute majority the re .Of f i c i a l  figures put the 
proportion at 85%, while Albanians claim it to be over 90%. In either case, the 
Serbs make up a relatively tiny portion of Kosovo/a's population. The 
Albanian share in Kosovo/a has been on a steady increase with the Albanians 
having the highest birth-rate in Europe. In 1961, for instance, the Albanians 
made up 67.2% of the population.^^ Serbian attempts to counter-balance it by 
colonizing the region with Serbs brought from outside have proved futile with 
the Serbs now making up about 10% of the Kosovo/a's population of 2 
million. In fact the Albanians now make-up 18% of new Yugoslavia' overall 
population.
Though all the non-Serbs are Muslims, the whole Muslim population in 
Kosovo/a is not Albanian. There is a small Turkish and a substantial Roma 
population in the region. Both of these are considered by the Albanians as 
Albanians because of the fact that one of the underlying factors of the 
Albanian-Serbian conflict is the religious cleavage; namely, Islam vs. 
Orthodoxy. There is no doubt that this cleavage increases inter-confessional 
solidarity. Nevertheless it disappoints the non-Albanians, in that their 
Albanian coreligionaries are out to assimilate them.
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The situation in Kosovo/a is very tense now. By the early 80s where Tito's 
death had flashed warnings about the future of Yugoslavia for which the 
founding father had established a delicate and tender system of checks and 
balances of national issues, economic grievances exacerbated the issue. The 
questioning of the Yugoslav system was accompanied in Kosovo/a by mass 
demonstrations. These demonstrations were led by people who were not 
satisfied with Kosovo/a's constitutional status in the federation. Desiring to 
extend the scope of the de fact republic status Kosovo/a had possessed since 
the amendments in 1974, the group envisaged to make Kosovo/a a full-fledged 
republic of the Yugoslav federation. This action itself caused problems. The 
Serbs who were already weary of Tito's latest reforms, which according to 
them curtailed Serbia and decreased Serbian power in the federation to the 
benefit of other nations acted against the Albanian wishes. Mass 
demonstrations were countered by strict police measures and an eventual 
putsch that ended Kosovo/a's privileged position in the federation by turning it 
into as mere province of Serbia.^^ To oppose these and discrimination, i.e. 
firing of Albanians from their governmental positions and the closing of 
Albanian schools , the Kosovar Albanians came out with the establishment of 
an underground Albanian parliament (in 1990) arid the formation of a well­
functioning Albanian state structure. All these have increased the tension in 
the area.79 The Serbs have in return retaliated with more police measures and 
human rights abuses.^« The public discrimination against the Albanians 
continues today in Kosovo/a. The Albanians organized around the Democratic 
League of Kosovo/a (LDK) have so far pursued policies of non-violent 
resistance, but depending upon Serbia's attitude towards Kosovo/a and other 
developments around the Balkans, at any time the situation may turn into a 
bloody armed conflict with unpredictable consequences.^!
3.9.3. The Magyars in Vojvodina and the Ethnic Make-up of the Region
The first Yugoslavia amputated Vojvodina from the Hungarian branch of the 
former Habsburgs. At the time no such entity as Vojvodina existed; the regions 
later to be unified to form Vojvodina were the Васка, the Srem and 
Yugoslavia's share of 2/3 of the Banat. Just as it is the case in Croatia's 
Slavonia and Baranja, Vojvodina formed as an autonomous region in the 
second Yugoslavia was and still is ethnically very much mixed. Although the 
substantial German and Jewish communities of the inter-war period are today 
seriously reduced (very much like other northern Balkan regions as a result of
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the deportations of post-W.W.II and also Nazi extermination policies); 
Vojvodina still has a very colorful ethnic composition.
The region today has six sizable and many small communities (It is the 
languages of these major communities respectively, Serbo-Croatian, of the 
Serbs and the Croats, Hungarian of the Magyars, Romanian, Czechoslovakian 
of the Czechs and the Slovaks and Ruthenian of the Ruthenians/ Ukrainians 
that are still recognized as the official languages in Vojvodina). 2^
The Serbs are the most numerous community in the region (around 54% of the 
population) and are remnants of those Ottoman Serbs fleeing over to the other 
side of the Danube, to the prospective Habsburg military frontier of Slavonia 
and the Srem. The Rumanians are another of the major communities in the 
Vojvodina. A total of 47.000 (around 3% of the local population) Rumanians 
live in the Banat, adjacent to Romania enjoying cultural and political rights as 
one of the major communities in Vojvodina. Croats living adjacent to Croatia 
(5.4% of the population) had enjoyed extensive rights in Vojvodina together 
with the Serbs, till the outbreak of the war in Croatia in 1991. Today the 
situation in Vojvodina is deteriorating as far as the Croats are concerned. The 
Czechs and Slovaks (together 70.000 and about 4% of Vojvodina's population) 
and the Ruthenians/ Ukrainians (around 20.000 and about 1% of Vojvodina's 
population) are both remnants of the Habsburg presence in the region.83 Today, 
these communities all enjoy extensive cultural and political rights as the 
constituent minority groups in the region.®^
Unlike the smaller minority groups who -with the exception of the Croats for 
the last few years- have enjoyed and are enjoying wide, cultural and political 
rights, the Magyars in Vojvodina are in a very difficult situation. At the 
moment animosity based on past grievances, is growing between the Magyars 
and the Serbian government.®®
There are two reasons for this: the first is the relatively large size of the 
minority, and the second is proximity of the Magyars to Hungary. The 
Magyars, the largest non-Serbian group in Vojvodina (around 25% of the total 
population) mostly live in the Васка, northern Vojvodina adjacent to Hungary. 
They accepted the confederalist constitution of 1974 with enthusiasm. The 
community, around 450.000 people formed itself into the Democratic 
Community of Vojvodina Hungarians (VMDK) during the dissolution process 
of Yugoslavia. Like in Kosovo/a, a constitutional putsch by the central
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government has ended Vojvodina's privileged status in Yugoslavia as a de- 
facto republic. Though there have been large scale violations of the cultural 
rights of the Magyars, the situation in Vojvodina is by no means comparable to 
that of Kosovo/a. Therefore "Unlike the Kosovo/a Albanians who boycotted 
the December 1990 elections in protest of the removal of autonomy for two 
provinces, the VMDK did take part in the elections and won eight seats out of a 
total of 250.8<^  The situation in Vojvodina is relatively calm and dependent upon 
further moves by the Serbian central government.
3.9.4. Muslims in the Sanjak
Serbia has a population of only 5.5 million should Kosovo/a and Vojvodina 
with a population of approximately 2 millions per each be excluded. In that 
population, the Muslims in the Sanjak make-up the largest minority group. 
(Serbs make up around 65% of larger Serbia, including Kosovo/a and Voj­
vodina, and 85% of smaller Serbia).^^
The Sanjak, or with its more proper name the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, was an 
Ottoman territorial unit, one of the six sanjaks of the Bosnian pashalik, linking 
the Pashalik to Kosovo/a in the south. When Bosnia went under the Habsburg 
occupation in 1878, the Sanjak, which was very similar to Bosnia with its 
predominantly Muslim population and characteristics remained in the Ottoman 
hands and was from then on separated from the Bosnian entity. The Sanjak 
later joined the first Yugoslavia after it was occupied by Serbia during the first 
Balkan war and was divided between Montenegro and Serbia when the Second 
Yugoslavia was designed as a federal republic. Since then frequent emigrations 
of the Sandjak Muslims -who have converted to Islam together with the 
Muslims in Bosnia and have seen themselves as Bosniacs through common 
history- have decreased the Muslim population in the Sanjak. Therefore today, 
the Muslims are not anymore a majority in the Montenegrin Sanjak, and only a 
slight one in the Serbian Sanjak.
In the Serbian Sanjak, the Muslims (around 350.000 people) constitute around 
66% of the population.®  ^ During the disintegration process of Yugoslavia the 
Sanjak Muslims gathered around the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), a 
local branch of the Bosnian Muslim SDA. Since then Muslims have organized 
elections for a local parliament and a referendum on political autonomy and 
independence. In this referendum, declared illegal by Serbia 69.4% of the 
population voted for independence.®^ The Serbian government has retaliated to
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this with extreme police measures against the Muslims. At the moment, Sanjak 
is under very strong supervision of the central government and the Yugoslav 
National army (JNA), and is highly valued by Serbia as a strategically 
indispensable territory linking Serbia to Montenegro and then to the Adriatic.^ 
The events to come in the Sanjak are likely to be determined by the result of 
the war in Bosnia, inasmuch as the Muslims in the Sanjak see the Muslims in 
Bosnia as their brethren and compatriots.’!
3.9.5. Other Minorities in Serbia (Kosovo/a and Vojvodina excluded)
Bulgarians (totaling 30.000) who live in enclaves ceded to Yugoslavia by 
Bulgaria following W.W.II; Albanians (around 50.000) living adjacent to 
Kosovo/a and a serious bone of contention in the eye of Serbian nationalism 
which is growing anxious of what it calls "Albanian demographic roll towards 
north"; and finally pockets of small Vlah communities on the mountains, but, 
here again, very much integrated into mainstream host culture may be cited 
among the less numerous minorities living within Serbia.’^
3.9.6 Minorities in Montenegro
Montenegro has a population of 600.000, in which the Montenegrins make up 
approximately 65%, hardly an overwhelming majority. "The Montenegrins 
speak Serbo-Croat, are Orthodox in religion and have been traditional allies of 
the Serbs. Some Montenegrin claim that they are in fact Serbs".
3.9.7. Muslims in Montenegro
The Sanjak Muslims in Montenegro (90.000 and making up 15% of the 
country's population) live in eastern Montenegro in what was once a part of the 
Ottoman Sanjak of Novi Bazar.’“^ As their counterparts, the Montenegrin 
Muslims also feel closely affiliated to the Bosnian Muslims, with whom they 
share a common history and identification. In the dissolution process of 
Yugoslavia, the Montenegrin Muslims have also been activated by the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia. They have united in the process with the Albanians 
around the Democratic Coalition of Muslims. However, unlike their brethren 
in Serbia, the Montenegrin Muslims have not been totally ostracized. They 
have participated in Montenegrin elections and have so far cooperated with the 
Montenegrin government. The relatively soft and compromise-oriented
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policies of the Montenegrin government have accentuated such tendencies of 
the Montenegrin Muslims who are in a relatively favorable situation.
3.9.8. Albanians in Montenegro
There is around 40.000 Albanians in Montenegro. (6.5 % of the population). 
These Albanians were incorporated into Montenegro following W.W.I, when 
Montenegro acquired some Albanian populated enclaves along its long 
disputed border with Albania. Although the repercussions of the Kosovo/a 
events have been felt among the Montenegrin Albanians, still the methods 
chosen by the Montenegrin government and the Albanians have not produced 
any tension, certainly nothing close to the situation in Kosovo/a. The efforts 
of the Montenegrin government to differentiate itself from Serbia and not to 
duplicate the Serbian experience have resulted in a more conciliatory situation 
with the result that the Democratic Alliance of the Muslims and the Albanians 
have participated in the Montenegrin elections to win 13 seats out of a total of 
125, thus forming a block in the parliament.^^ Yet, the future of the minorities 
remains to be an excitable issue, likely to be galvanized by the spill-over 
effects of what is happening in Bosnia and what might happen in Kosovo/a.
3.10. PEOPLES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
Among all the Balkan states, Bosnia-Herzegovina is the most striking example 
to what extent ethnic groups, religions and nations may be in the region. The 
situation in Bosnia is similar to that in Macedonia or the Vojvodina where it is 
difficult to speak about an overwhelming majority, but goes even beyond any 
similarities in that there is no majority community in Bosnia. 6^
The country is now home to three different ethnic groups, the Bosnians 
(Muslims), Serbs and the Croats all of which are differentiated through their 
religions, respectively, Islam, Orthodoxy and Catholicism. During the 
Ottoman period, the Muslims at most times made up the largest portion. They 
were followed by the Serbs and the Croats in line. Muslim share in the popula­
tion was around 50% by late 19th century when Bosnia went under Habsburg 
occupation. However, the migration of many Muslims into the Ottoman empire 
following the establishment of the Habsburg rule, which became permanent in 
1908-9 resulted in a decrease in their population. At the time Muslims 
controlled much of the wealth in Bosnia: in 1918 70% of the Bosnian land was
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held by the Muslims.^^ The Muslim "exodus" out of Bosnia continued 
unabated towards the Ottoman controlled Balkan territories and then towards 
Turkey once the Ottoman Empire was dismembered.
By the outbreak of W.W.II, Serbs had become the largest group in Bosnia. 
War time atrocities by the Ustasha government against the Serbs caused a 
decline in the Serbian population. After the war, the Muslim population at an 
increasing rate continued to form the largest segment of the population of 
Bosnia, which became now a constituent republic of the second Yugoslavia. 
The post-war industrialization efforts followed by massive urbanization caused 
a demographic shift in the country. Here, the tradition in Bosnia to associate 
urban culture with Islam led to a gradual voluntary assimilation of parts of the 
non-Muslim population into this urban Islamic identity. So much so that in the 
census of 1981 39.5% of the population was Muslim; another 32% Serbian and 
a 18.4% Croat and a final 7.9% "Yugoslavs" as they declared themselves. It is 
apparent that in the Bosnian case a large portion of this self-declared Yugoslav 
population were actually Muslims. According to the 1991 census, the Muslim 
share in the population -excluding those declaring themselves as "Yugoslavs"- 
had already gone up to 42-43%.9® However, even that would fall short of 
making the Muslims as a majority in Bosnia.
The Bosnian population was so much mixed that prior to the war, although 
Muslims made up an absolute majority in 32, Serbs in 31 and the Croats in 14 
districts, there were still 23 districts without an absolute majority, just like 
Bosnia itself.99 The Muslims made up an absolute majority in central 
Herzegovina and south-central, central, north-central Bosnia, in the cities of 
Mostar, Banja Luka, Sarajevo and Tuzla, in eastern Bosnia all along the Drina 
valley, and also in the western end of Bosnia (around Bihac-Cazin). In 
addition, Muslims made up substantial minorities in eastern Herzegovina, 
western and northern Bosnia.
The Serbs made up an absolute majority in eastern Herzegovina, Western 
Bosnia (what is known as Bosanski Krajina), northeastern Bosnia, and the 
areas especially north-east of Sarajevo. They were substantial minorities in 
eastern Bosnia (on the Drina valley), northern and north-central Bosnia as well 
as central Herzegovina and the Bihac region.
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Croats formed an absolute majority in western Herzegovina and sections of 
north Bosnia and also substantial minorities in central Herzegovina as well as 
south-central, southern and northern Bosnia.
This picture however only simplifies the situation in Bosnia. Even in the case 
where one village or town was populated predominantly by one ethnic group, 
in the next town or village the situation was just the opposite. And in cases 
where a city was predominantly of one ethnic group the rural areas around the 
city would be another group. This peculiar situation was extremely spoiled by 
the war in Bosnia which broke out in early 1992.ioi
Ethnic cleansing, massacres and deportations organized by the Serbs targeting 
the Muslims as well as those atrocities committed upon the Muslims and by 
the Serbs by the Croats coupled with mass fighting between the Croat militia, 
the Serbian paramilitary and the Bosnian army have drastically changed the 
ethnic make-up of the country, Serbian aggression has drastically "cleansed" 
western Bosnia (Bosanski Krajina), eastern and central Herzegovina, 
northeastern and eastern Bosnia (except for the enclaves of Zepa, Gorajde and 
Srebrenica) and the environs of Sarajevo from the Muslims. In addition, Croat 
actions have cleaned central and western Herzegovina as well as parts of south- 
central and north Bosnia from the Muslims. The Serbs have also managed to 
get rid of the Croats in northern and north-eastern Bosnia.
Today the Bosnian government, an alliance of the Muslims and the Croats, 
controls western and central Herzegovina; strip of territory running from north 
Bosnia (the environs of Brcko), through central Bosnia into southern Bosnia; 
enclaves in eastern Bosnia and the very western Bosnia (the enclave of Bihac). 
Among these territories the Croats have exclusive control only in western and 
sections of the central Herzegovina. As for the Serbs they control whatever is 
left from Bosnia, around 2/3 of the territories.^®^
Despite all the horrors and crimes of the past neither the Serbs nor the Croats 
have been able to carve out meaningful territorial units. The Serb territories 
are still far from establishing a geographical continuum (the link between Serb 
controlled western Bosnia and the rest of the Serbian controlled territories is 
interrupted by the Muslims and Croats in northern Bosnia) or touch to Serbia 
proper (the Muslim enclaves on the Drina valley strategically threaten links to 
Serbia on the other side of the river).
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Nevertheless, the war has changed the demographic balance of the country. 
Around 2.500.000 people (nearly 80% of which are Muslims) have been driven 
out of their homes. These people now live in enclaves, away from their home 
towns or in refugee camps, mainly in Croatia but also elsewhere in the rump 
Yugoslavia, all over the Balkans, in central and western Europe. Such 
population transfers have seriously disrupted the ethnic balance.
Moreover, war casualties are estimated to be over 200.000. A large number of 
these casualties (over 90%) are from the Muslims as a result of atrocities and 
war crimes. Such casualties must have already changed the percentage of 
various groups in the Bosnian population. Whatever the situation may be, 
before the finalization of the war and its crimes it should not be possible to 
accurately know the "new position" of the peoples of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
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CHAPTER IV. THE SECURITY DIMENSION 
4.1. A THEORETICAL REVIEW
In the discipline of international studies security may be defined as depending 
on two aspects; "(1) the absence of objective dangers, whether or not they are 
recognized, and (2) the absence of subjective fears, whether or not they are 
recognized".! This definition makes the nature of security a composite of the 
objective reality and the subjective perceptions. "What determines 
governments' policies is their perception of threats and dangers, even if they 
may be under -or over- estimated. Therefore both perceived and actual dangers 
as formulated by the above definition of security need to be examined".2
This theoretical entrée brings us to the definition of insecurity (a negative 
security perception in other words) which may be defined as the presence of 
objective dangers and subjective fears. Perception plays a significant role in 
that it is the subjective perception that determines whether or not a threat 
exists.
4.2. SECURITY CONCEPT AND THE BALKANS
The literature covering the security dimension of Balkan affairs may be 
roughly categorized into two periods. The ending of the cold-war roughly 
marks the actual delineation between these two periods. Shoup's work 
Problems of Balkan Security-Southeastern Europe in the 1990's is a classical 
example for the first period, the cold-war years.^ Although published in the 
aftermath of the cold-war, this work still uses a cold-war analytical framework, 
looking at the Balkan affairs and the security issues in the region from the great 
power perspective. The work considers Balkan security simply as a product of 
the overall security designs of the world. Concentrating mostly on Western 
and Eastern interests in the region, the book fails to recognize Balkan dynamics 
such as the minorities and the region's sui generis history. By underestimating 
these factors, which have largely contributed to security concerns in the 
peninsula, this work remains far from being complete.
With the end of the cold-war in the literature covering security issues in the 
Balkans less attention was to be paid to global determining factors (such as
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super power rivalry). Instead sui generis factors shaping security in the 
peninsula began to come to the forefront as parts of the analytical scheme.
Cowen Karp's work titled "Central and Eastern Europe: The challenge of 
Transition" may be cited as an example of the new analytical framework now 
used to approach security issues in the Balkans.'^ With an entire chapter 
dedicated to the Balkans and another one to the former Yugoslavia, both of 
which focus on the post cold-war security concerns, the work aims to point 
deep rooted but somehow neglected factors molding the security perceptions in 
the Balkans.
The chapter by Daniel N. Nelson entitled "Creating Security in the Balkans"
starts off by analyzing the historical legacies in the peninsula.^ Nelson calls the 
Balkans "a threat rich environment", one that lives with the legacy of empires.^ 
Trying to grasp the roots of negative security perceptions -those based on 
perceptions of threat- the author analyzes imperial traditions in the Balkans 
aiming to see how past experiences of Balkan communities have shaped and 
still continue to shape security perceptions.^
"The waxing and waning of these empires and their 
battles with each other and against indigenous peoples, 
fashioned the Balkan peninsula of today. Obvious, yet 
overlooked by external analysts, is the legacy of imperial 
conquest throughout the eastern half of Europe and 
particularly in the continent's southeastern comer. The 
distribution of ethnic groups, languages and faiths is a 
direct consequence of migration -often because of 
imminent threat- and colonization due to conquest. The 
residues of empires are the Diasporas of every nation and 
the irredentist claims of every state in the region. An 
intermingling of peoples and borders leaves a high-threat 
environment".»
Nelson goes on to analyze the security perceptions of independent Balkan 
countries. Excluding Yugoslavia, for it is covered by the next chapter of the 
book, but also Greece and Turkey, under the influence of the cold-war 
analytical framework of dividing the Balkan countries into categories as 
communist and non-communist; Nelson fails to develop an all inclusive 
analysis of the region. Even then taking Albania, Romania and Bulgaria into
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consideration, the article points out the security concerns faced by these states 
with respect to the minorities within their borders. This is a basic novelty 
where emphasis is placed on specific dynamics of each country (i.e. the Balkan 
minorities) to see how these affect the security perception of each country 
towards its ethnic minorities.
The next article in the book, titled "The Former Yugoslavia: Emerging Security 
Orientations goes one step further to link security perceptions as such to the 
inter-Balkan affairs.^ Focusing on Yugoslavia in particular, the author, Stephen 
Larrabee analyzes the relations of the republics of the rump Yugoslavia with 
other ex-Yugoslav and also non-Yugoslav states. In so doing, Larrabee 
touches upon the issue of how minorities in the Balkans would influence a 
state's security perception towards its neighbors. Pointing to particular cases of 
deteriorating security perceptions, due to links of minorities to states other 
than the Larrabee speaks about a good number of negative security perceptions 
based on perceptions of threat. Larrabee tries to see what sort of alliances, 
friendly and unfriendly relations, are likely to develop in the Balkans under the 
influence of current security perceptions.
With the exception of these few works cited above, the current post cold-war 
literature on the issue of Balkan security tackles the security issue basically on 
the inter-state level, without due reference to ethnic minorities and the internal 
dynamics of the Balkan states. This level of analysis regards threats to security 
as a creation of possession of arms and level of offensive and defensive 
parities. 10
An approach to Balkan security from a perspective including the minorities; the 
security concerns created by the minorities for the states they live in (their 
home states) and the states to which they feel attached (their mother states); 
and historical legacies of the peninsula should be beneficial for the purpose of 
any study that aims to aggrandize particular Balkanic features that have shaped 
still do and shall shape the history of the peninsula.
It should be noted here that this study remains aware of other factors such 
as the possession ot arms, level of offensive and defensive parities, regional 
and global security concerns or still, a much less debated factor, personal 
fears of the power elite (i.e. fear of losing administrative, financial, political 
power especially in times of uncertainty etc.) as possible determinants of 
Balkan security. For purposes of methodological clarity, however, this
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study omits these factors and concentrates solely on the perspective 
explained above.
4.3. SECURITY IN THE BALKANS
In the course of the dismemberment of the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires, 
nearly without exceptions all the political boundaries in the Balkans were 
drawn after bloody wars in a rather arbitrary maimer. This fact has left a bitter 
legacy in the peninsula. Great ideas that envisaged to rejuvenate some past 
kingdoms without any attention to who lived at the time on those territories to 
be conquered were especially popular in the Balkans during the period. As a 
result of these and also due to fiery stmggles among the Balkan nations to 
establish separate states for themselves, ethnically non-homogenous Balkan 
states had come into existence. Ethnic communities left on the "wrong side" of 
the new political boundaries developed deep resentments towards their host 
communities (i.e. home states) whom they regarded as "villain masters", 
keeping them under slavery and away from their brethren.
Where independent Balkan states came into existence by each other's side two 
Balkanic trends exacerbated the existing resentments. These trends were the 
maltreatment of ethnic ininorities by the home states and ininorities' 
collaboration with their mother states.
Even before facing the maltreatment of its home state, the Balkan minority may 
have nurtured a certain feeling of mistrust towards its home state. After that, 
every unhappy experience of discrimination and maltreatment could only 
strengthen so much mistrust so that soon it became a deep rooted feeling, one 
that would survive into our time. In fact this mistrust was of bilateral nature. 
The home state could feel certain uneasiness vis-à-vis the minorities from the 
very moment of its independence.
The nature of nationalism worked here as well. The rivalry between Balkan 
nations for domination over the others and the territories of these others 
survived into the framework of the new Balkan states. The previous enemies 
were now to live within the same state, one as the possessor of that state, and 
the other as a minority of the same state. Possessing the necessary political and 
coercive tools, Balkan states would not hesitate to take action. Coercion used 
by a Balkan state towards its previous enemy and current hostage could
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deteriorate bilateral relations between a state and a segment of its peoples. 
Needless to say, the minority communities played their share in the game. 
Always remembering pre-independence rivalries for territory, minority 
communities would never give up their demands. They keep alive their dreams 
of greater states into which they might join by seceding from their respective 
home states. Such aspirations voiced by a minority group could nurture and 
enhance the mistrust felt by the home state towards the minority communities.
The picture we draw here as a result of these historical experiences is as 
follows: mistrust dominatiiig relations between the home state and the minority 
community. Such mistrust shaping the security perception of each party vis-à- 
vis the other. Therefore mutual security perceptions turning out to be of 
extremely negative nature, the minority and the home state identifying its 
counterpart as a potential threat. And then as a result of the links between the 
minority and its mother state, the mother state also coming into the picture to 
share the negative security perception of the minority. This on the other hand 
adding up to the negative security perception of the home state. To put it 
bluntly: the home state starts to see the minority and its mother state as threats 
to its territorial integrity and its security, likewise the minority and the mother 
state perceive the home state as a threat to the existence of the minority.
4.4. THE SECURITY TRIANGLE: THE MINORITY, ITS HOME STATE 
AND ITS MOTHER STATE
In dealing with relations between a minority community and its home and 
mother states, one needs to simplify that triangular network down to three set 
of relationships: the iSrst one between the minority and its home state; another 
one between the minority and its mother state; and a third one between the 
home state and the mother state.
4.4.1. Relations Between a Minority and Its Host State
There appear various factors shaping the relations between a minority and its 
home state:
demographic factors: here the size, condensation and dispensation of a
minority are important factors. Whether a certain minority is a sizable 
community in the overall population of its country or whether it makes up a 
majority anywhere in that country are important criteria that affect the security
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perception of the home state. The Turks of Bulgaria, Magyars of Romania and 
Serbs of Croatia may be worth mentioning in this regard.
geographic location: strategic geographic location (such as one next to the 
territory of the mother state); or living on an historically disputed buffer zone 
area are of significant importance. For instance, the Turkish minority in 
\ji4stern Thrace of Greece or the Albanians of western Macedonia, Magyars 
of Transylvania and so on all bordering their mother states create a 
perception of threat for their host states, which view their geographic 
location as vulnerable to exploitation and prone to secessionism.
past experiences: conversion, deportation, genocide, massacre, forceful
assimilation, cultural hegemony, economic advantages and disadvantages, 
rivalry over territory and historical feuds are examples to various historical 
factors that may be influential in determining the course of relations between a 
minority and its home state, if the minority was subjected to one or more of 
these in the past. The Turks of Romania or the Serbs of Slovenia both of 
which have no memorable experiences of maltreatment are good examples 
to minorities that feel no resentment towards their host states. The 
Magyars of Romania and the Turks of Western Thrace do form, however, a 
a counter example.
cultural and linguistic features of the minority: a minority's cultural and
linguistic affinity to its host community as well as shared religion also affect 
nature of relations between itself and its home state. It should, however, be 
noted that, depending upon the circumstances shared cultural, linguistic 
and religious features may or may not draw the minority and the host state 
closer. For instance, the shared religion. Orthodoxy in Greece seems to 
bridge the gap between the Greeks and Vlachs of Greece, whereas in 
Albania it does not suffice to bring the Greeks and Albanians of southern 
Albania together. More examples could be easily cited for other cases.
present circumstances: political-cultural rights a minority enjoys; social and 
economic status of a minority, i.e. the share of the minority in the political, 
administrative apparatus, business, education, military, intelligentsia and the 
opposition could also determine relations between a minority community and 
its host state.
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4.4.2. Relations Between a Minority and Its Mother State
Using the upper classification it may be said that the following factors are of 
overriding importance in shaping relations between a minority and its mother 
state:
past experiences: common past experiences (i.e. the minority having lived 
under the rule of its mother state); minority's self-association with the 
nationalist cause of the mother state and collaboration with it in that respect are 
among historical factors that would determine the cause of relations between a 
minority and its mother state.
cultural and linguistic factors: minority's affinity in language, religion and 
culture to the mother state could also determine the cause of relations between 
the minority and its mother state, by defining to which extent that minority 
community may identify itself with its mother state.
present circumstances: the attitude of the mother state towards the minority 
community (i.e. whether it disseminates separatism among the community or 
gives logistics, political support to the same group) also contribute to shaping 
the relations between the minority and its mother state.
4.4.3. Relations Between the Host and Mother States
The nature of relations between a home state and a mother state is not 
independent from the relations between mother state and minority on the one 
hand and those between the minority and the mother state on the other hand. 
This is not to say,· however, that the affairs between these two states are 
determined exclusively by the above set of factors. On the contrary, regional 
or global political considerations (such as a need to create inter-block 
solidarity); economic desiderata; the capacity of political will; and realpoU tik 
concerns may influence the course of relations between the mother state and 
the home state regardless of the position of the minority community.
Having examined all factors molding the relations in the triangular network 
formed by the mother state, the home state and the minority community one 
also needs to see which minorities in the Balkan would fit into this framework 
of triangular relationship.
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4.4.4. Minorities without Mother States in Existence
Not all the Balkan minority communities possess mother states. Communities 
such as the Vlahs and Gypsies fall into this category. A good number of the 
Balkan minorities which have the opportunity to relate to some states as their 
mother states have either chosen and/or have been directed not to do so. It is 
either the fact that the above factors structuring the triangular network of 
relations have worked to the benefit -and not the detriment of the minority- 
and, therefore, the minority does not feel compelled to look around for a 
protector; and/or the minority has never related itself to other states because the 
necessary circumstances were not there. The Turks in Romania, Czechs and 
Slovaks in the rump Yugoslavia, Serbs in Slovenia and Romania may be 
counted as examples to a certain number of Balkan communities that have 
declined to adopt mother states although prospective states for such a purpose 
did exist.
4.4.5. Minorities with mother states
History has proven that a good number of Balkan minorities possess mother 
states to whom they have linked themselves in their quest for security and 
safety. Here, by taking several cases of minorities with mother states into 
account we shall try to shed light on specific cases for an analysis of the factors 
defining these cases. The purpose here should also be trying to see the extent 
to which inter-state relations may be affected and shaped by the security 
perceptions of the home states vis-à-vis the minorities and the vice versa. For 
such an analysis, Greeks in Albania, Turks (and Muslims) in Greece and 
Bulgaria, Magyars in Romania, Serbs in Croatia, Albanians in Kosovo/a/a and 
Macedonia are among the well-defined exemplary cases of minority 
communities with mother states.
4.5. GIŒEKS IN ALBANIA
The Greek-Orthodox community in southern Albania is the sole community in 
that country that possesses a mother state. A community of 50.000 -according 
to official sources- , and 400.000 -according to the Greek sources- the Greeks 
in Albania mostly live in those southern sections of Albania bordering Greece. 
Whatever its size the community plays a very important role in the domestic 
political life and the foreign affairs of Albania.
63
Albanian official sources try to underestimate the importance of the issue by 
figuring the size of the Greek-Orthodox community as low as possible. Greek 
estimates trying to do just the opposite inflate the number of the community by 
including into their number not only the Greek speakers of the Greek-Orthodox 
faith but also Albanian speakers of the Greek-Orthodox faith. Whatever its 
size the Greek community in Albania is not a major community in any part of 
the country; nevertheless a majority community in southern Albania, the very 
vicinity of Greece. This fact itself is enough to worry the Albanian 
government. The southern portion of Albania, populated by the Greeks is 
referred to in Greek official terminology as the northern Epirus. Through this 
name, which symbolizes Greece's approach to the issue, Greece tries to link 
southern Albania (northern Epirus) to a part of its territory, southern Epirus of 
Greece bordering Albania.
In fact, in 1913 when Albania was established following the Balkan wars, 
Albania's border with Greece was never properly marked. Due to Greece's 
aspirations over the area, the major powers of the time intentionally postponed 
the issue of border demarcation, actually leaving southern Albania to nominal 
Greek rule." Greek rule over southern Albania lasted till the aftermath of 
W.W.I. With the final post W.W.I peace settlements, southern Albania finally 
-and for the first time- became a part of Albania proper. Since then, this area 
with a mixed population has been a part of Albania. The Greek community's 
aspirations to join Greece, however, have been far from withering, on the 
contrary, rising at intervals. When during W.W.II central authority in Albania 
evaporated due to foreign invasions; visioning a smaller Albania to which 
southern Albania would not belong, the Greek community hoped to join 
Greece. After that, in the cold war period, cautious of the past experiences, the 
communist Albanian governments utilized various methods to finish with the 
issue of the Greek minority for good. The result was that the Greek identity in 
Albania was constantly denied. By 1950's according to the Albanian official 
ideology there were Greek-Orthodox Albanians in southern Albania but no 
Greeks. This policy of denial, accompanied by means of voluntary 
assimilation through shared religion offered to the same community remained 
in effect till the end of the cold-war. 12
With the fall of communism all forms of opposition started to flourish in 
Albania. The Greek community, now that the freedom of expression was more 
of a reality, organized itself around a political party, the Omonia. Albanian
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officials did try to bar the Greek party from entering freely held elections. 
Even then the Greek party managed to send MP's to the Albanian parliament.
Meanwhile, with the issue being defrozen, the Greek government and 
especially the Greek-Orthodox church have made efforts to re establish former 
links with the Greeks of southern Albania. The Albanian government has 
reacted sharply, especially in the case of dissemination of Greek identity 
through the Greek-Orthodox church. The government sees the Greek-Orthodox 
church as competing with the autonomous Albanian-Orthodox Church. On the 
other hand, the fact that Greece has not formally repudiated its links with the 
secessionist movements in southern Albania or relinquished its territorial 
claims to the same region further aggravates the problem. This situation 
seriously affects the relations between Albania and Greece and prevents the 
two countries from developing meaningful relations.
In the case of the Greek minority in Albania, the minority community seriously 
affects the relations between its mother state (Greece), and home state 
(Albania) by providing uncertainty to the course of the inter-state relations. In 
this particular case, Greece's current way of dealing with that minority and the 
position of the minority towards Albanian government and the vice versa have 
all worked to create a serious security problem for Albania. Whereas the 
Greek minority perceives an imminent threat from the Albanian government; 
Albania feels that its territorial integrity is threatened by Greece and the 
presence of a Greek minority in southern Albania. Therefore, Tirana is far 
from recognizing this minority as an integral part of Albanian population 
unless Greece drops its claims to the region and reforms its links with the 
Greek minority of southern Albania.
4.6. TURKS (AND MUSLIMS) IN GREECE
At the moment the only minority in Greece that possesses a mother state (other 
than the Macedons who are on the way to acquire Macedonia as their potential 
mother state in near future) is the Turks (and Muslims) of Western Thrace. 
United around a common Turkish identity, this minority feels closely attached 
to Turkey. Concentrated in Western Thrace, right on the border with Turkey, 
and forming about 1/3 of the province's population, the minority occupies a 
precarious position in the eyes of the Greek government.
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Defined under the Lausanne Peace Treaty of W.W.I as a Muslim minority with 
equal treatment to be accorded, the minority now regards itself more Turkish 
than anything elsed'  ^ Greece's attempts to eradicate the Turkish identity of the 
minority by denying and punishing anything as such have paradoxically 
strengthened the solidarity and the sense of Turkishness, of the minority. 
Greece's violation of the terms of the Lausanne Treaty resulting in the abuse of 
cultural and religious rights has enhanced the historic ties of this community 
with Turkey. Facing outright discrimination, forced migration and economic 
burdens imposed by the Greek government, the community has lately 
organized democratic forums and sent MP's to the Greek parliament. 
Meanwhile, the more vociferous attitude of these MP's in the face of increased 
discrimination has contributed to the anxiety of the Greek government. At the 
moment uncomfortable about the presence of a Turkish minority living on the 
border with Turkey and in the middle of a sea of Hellenes, Greece still hopes to 
eradicate the Turkish identity in Western Thrace.
On the other hand, Turkey's direct -when compared to its official policy 
towards other Turkish/ Muslim minorities in the Balkans- interest in this 
minority has aggravated Greece's subjectively perceived security concerns. 
Although Turkey justifies its direct interest on basis of the Lausanne Treaty, 
which does give Turkey the right of a form of protectorate over the Turks of 
Western Thrace; Greece still believes the Greek territorial integrity to be 
threatened by the existence of this minority and the close links it has with 
Turkey.‘5 the issue of the Turks in Western Thrace continues to negatively 
affect the Turco-Greek relations, in addition to many other issues between 
these two countries, the case of the Turks in Greece shows to which extent the 
security problem created by a minority may contribute negatively the relations 
between the two states.
4.7. TURKS (AND MUSLIMS) IN BULGARIA
Just like the Muslims in Western Thrace, various Muslim groups in Bulgaria, 
of Turkish, Bulgarian, Roma or Tatar origin, are also united around a Turkish 
identity. The above-mentioned specific Balkan circumstances as well as 
official Bulgarian hostility towards this minority have consolidated the Turkish 
identity among the peoples of Islamic faith to the extent that the Turkish 
identity has largely replaced other ethnic identities among the Muslims of 
Bulgaria.
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A sizable community, over 10% of Bulgaria's population -according to official 
Bulgarian estimates- and more than twice of that -according to Turkish 
sources- the Turks (and Muslims) of Bulgaria are concentrated in two regions 
of the country; in the northeast on the southern Dobrudja plains ,and in the 
southeast on the Maritsa plains and the Rhodope mountains, bordering Turkey.
The minority forms the majority of the population in the southeast of Bulgaria, 
around Kirdzhali for example; and a substantial part of the population with an 
important share in the economic life in the Dobrudja. Having enjoyed certain 
cultural, political rights in Bulgaria in the inter-war period, the Turkish 
community in Bulgaria lived through several forced, semi-forced migrations 
imposed onto it by the communist regime in the cold-war period. As in the 
Western Thrace, the shared cultural, religious affinities and family links with 
Turkey have kept alive a gravitation among the Bulgarian Turks towards 
Turkey. Official discrimination towards the Muslims, violation of the minority 
rights granted to the Turks under Bulgaria's constitution came to a climax by 
early 1980's. The Bulgarian government had always felt uneasy about this 
minority, whose population growth rate surpassed by far the population growth 
rate of the Bulgarian population. The government's view was that with such 
birth rate, the Turks were on the way to become a constituent part of the 
Bulgarian population. This anxiety contributed in 1980s to an officially 
conducted policy of forced assimilation. A ban on educational institutions, 
religious practices, ethnic names and the use of native tongues, initiated by 
early 80s and accompanied by strict police measures lasted till 1989. With 
increased tension between Turkey and Bulgaria on the issue of the Turkish 
minority, the gravitation of the Turkish minority towards Turkey became more 
than ever. The Bulgarian government tried to decrease the ratio of the Turks in 
the overall population of the country by letting them emigrate to Turkey 
through a government organized mass exodus (1989).
However, the fall of communism bringing with itself a restructuring of 
Bulgaria's domestic and foreign policy terminated the policy of forced 
assimilation towards the Turks. Repudiating the policies of the "ancient 
regime", the new reform governments halted the policy of forced assimilation. 
A push for economic desiderata necessitating closer links with Turkey 
coincided with this softening. As a result, more than half of the 300.000 Turks 
who had emigrated to Turkey by 1989 returned to Bulgaria once the new 
regime made it clear that it would develop a new attitude towards the Turks.
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Gradually cultural and religious rights were restored to the Turks. In this new 
atmosphere of freedom, the Turks and Muslims of Bulgaria rallied themselves 
around a political party, the Movement of Rights and Freedoms (Haklar ve 
Özgürlükler Hareketi- HÖH). The HÖH came out as the third largest force in 
the freely held elections of 1990. Becoming a key factor in Bulgarian politics, 
the HÖH successfully and cleverly distanced itself from Turkey. Unlike the 
situation in Western Thrace where a Turkish party meant more open links with 
Turkey, in Bulgaria the situation was the reverse. Contributing to the 
metamorphosis in Bulgaria, the HÖH helped the Turkish community to 
transform itself from an alienated minority community into an integral part of 
the Bulgarian political life. Today, except for the nationalist circles, the 
Turkish community in Bulgaria becomes day by day a part of the mainstream 
Bulgarian affairs.
When Bulgaria's security concerns and perception of a threat were maximized 
during the eighties, the Turkish minority was a bone of contention between 
Turkey and Bulgaria. By the late 80s the tension had built up to such an extent 
that Turkey and Bulgaria were on the verge of a war.
This has changed in the last years. Confidence building measures between the 
armies and governments of the two countries together with the successfiil 
policies of the Turkish minority to distance itself from Turkey and Turkey's 
pohcy in return not to interfere the domestic affairs (i.e. the issue of the 
Turkish minority) of Bulgaria have amehorated the Turco-Bulgarian 
re la tio n s.T o d ay  the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is a unique case in the 
Balkans, in that its relations with its mother state mid home state produce no 
conflict but cooperation.
4.8. MAGYARS IN ROMANIA
The Magyar community in Romania lives in the western provinces of that 
country, namely the former Habsburg regions of the Banat and Transylvania. 
Being the largest minority in Romania, the Magyars make up a majority of the 
population in central Transylvania, away from Hungarian border; but also a 
substantial portion of the population in northern Transylvania, a belt 
connecting central Transylvania to Hungary. Enjoying high cultural political 
and economic advantages over the local Rumanian population during the 
Habsburg rule, the Magyars of the region benefited well from the
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administrative system of the Dual Monarchy through which they exercised 
almost absolute control in Transylvania and the Banat.i^
Transylvania came under Rumanian rule following W.W.I, which altered 
radically the political situation there. The Rumanian government and 
Rumanians gradually gained control over Transylvania. The Rumanians, who 
had suffered discrimination through the acts of the Hungarian crown in the 19th 
century, retaliated likewise once they became the rulers. Meanwhile, Hungary 
never dropped its claims to Transylvania and sought to annex this territory back 
to Hungary. Siding with the Nazi Germany during W.W.II, the Hungarian 
government managed to receive from Romania central and northern 
Transylvania. This was, however, to be short-lived, When W.W.II came to 
an end, so did the Hungarian rule over the area.
A joint attempt by Hungary and Romania to accommodate the Magyars into 
Romania by providing them with autonomous region of their own during 
1950's calmed down the tension to an extent. This unique trial in the Balkans 
was to prove short-lived because Romania doubted whether autonomy in the 
area was simply the first step in the direction of the region's annexation to 
Hungary. Due to lack of confidence between Bucharest and Hungary, the 
Magyar community continued to look towards Hungary and the experience of 
an autonomous Magyar region ceased to exist by late 1950s.i^
Never again able to acquire their advantageous position, the Magyars in 
Transylvania continued to link themselves to their mother state through the 
entire cold-war period for safety and to regain their rights. As a result, Hungary 
and Romania became adversaries, creating the only case of enmity between any 
two members of the Warsaw Pact through the cold-war era. The need for inter­
block solidarity only helped to freeze the issue. But the issue could reemerge 
as a serious source of discontent soon after the fall of communism and the 
dismemberment of the Warzsaw Treaty Organization. By late 1980s ethnic 
unrest in Romania coincided with the opposition to the communist regime. It 
is not surprising that the first attempts to oust the Ceausescu regime were 
triggered off by the Magyar minority in the Banat town, Timisoara. In fact 
throughout the entire Balkan peninsula ethnic minorities contributed 
substantially to the overthrow of communist regimes and then many of them 
formed their political organization. The Organization of the Magyars in 
Romania, the Democratic Federation of Romanian Hungarians (RMDSZ) 
continued to be a stronghold of opposition before and after the fall of the
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Ceausescu regime. Unlike Bulgaria where the situation improved for the ethnic 
Turks after 1989, in Romania no substantial changes occurred. This 
heightened the grievance of the Magyar community that had hoped for an 
improvement in its situation once and if communism fell.
Under these circumstances, the Magyar community drew closer than ever 
towards Hungary. The Hungarian government on the other hand, instead of 
distancing itself from the Magyar minority and communicating with the 
Rumanian government, has acted as the protector of the Magyars in Romania.
A statement by the Hungarian Prime Minister Jozef Antall that he is the prime 
minister of 15 million Hungarians (a number which includes the population of 
Hungary circa 10 million, but also those Hungarians living in the Vojvodina, 
Croatia, Romania, Ukraine and Slovakia) is only an example.20
The Magyar minority in Romania is a clear example of deep security problems 
that may be created by a minority in the Balkans.
"A sense of peril and the potential for imrest do not arise 
merely from the numerical strength of minorities.
Instead Rumanians and any government in Bucharest 
recognize clearly the appeal of the Hungarian state to 
ethnic kin inside the Rumanian state. This attraction is 
particularly strong in so far as Hungary offers more 
economic, cultural and educational opportunities.
Romania's suspect, not without cause, is that such appeal 
will reduce the control over Transylvania."2i
Today the position of the Magyar minority in Transylvania vis-à-vis Hungary 
and Romania continues to affect unfavorably the relations between these two 
countries.
4-9. SERBS IN CROATIA
Never part of any Serbian state, the Serbian community in Croatia lived under 
the Habsburg domain in certain parts of today's Croatia, joined the First 
Yugoslavia with Croatia which then became one of the six constituent 
republics of Tito's Yugoslavia. Forming 16% of Croatia's population, and a 
majority of the population in eastern Slavonia (which borders Serbia) as well as 
the Krajina (in the regions of Lika, Kordun and Banija which surround Bosnia
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to the west and the north); the Serbs of Krajina enjoyed extensive rights during 
the second Yugoslavia as the largest constituent nation of that state.
The historically strong movement to unite all the Serbs in one Serbian state 
always appealed to the Krajina Serbs. Atrocities committed during W.W.II by 
the Fascist Ustasha state against the Krajina Serbs only increased the tendency 
among the Serbs to join the Serbian state. Nevertheless, the tension eased, 
since the federal structure of the second Yugoslavia providing all ethnic groups 
widely defined cultural and political rights wherever the community lived and 
whatever its size did satisfy the Krajina Serbs. Therefore, it was not until the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia that the Krajina Serbs voiced their discomfort about 
having to live in Croatia.22
But as soon as the disintegration of Yugoslavia became more and more 
pronounced they lost no time in expressing their desire for a larger Serbian 
state where their rights would be guaranteed and where they would not be 
treated as second class citizens. Being a part of the largest Yugoslav nation, 
the Krajina Serbs were alarmed by the prospects of becoming a mere minority 
in a new Croat state which would be designated primarily for the Croats. 
Croatia's irreconcilable attitude -based on its own perceptions of Serbian 
domination of the second Yugoslavia- towards the Krajina Serbs came as 
denial of their identity. To thsi may be added Serbia's open concern and direct 
interest in manipulating the Krajina Serbs. Choosing to fight rather than to 
remain in Croatia, the Krajina Serbs were aided by the Jugoslav National 
Army, that had by the outbreak of war in Croatia become a de-facto Serbian 
army in the dissolution process of Yugoslavia, in their quest to break away 
from Croatia. 23
The clashes soon turned into a full scale civil war. With the help of its mother 
state, Serbia, (a.k.a. the new Yugoslavia) the Krajina Serbs established military 
control over 1/3 of Croatia's territory. During this process, the entire Croat 
population living in these territories was "ethnically cleansed". Today the 
unilaterally declared Serbian Republic of Krajina still executes control over 
these territories while keeping alive its dreams to join its mother state when 
international political circumstances prove suitable.24 After much killing and 
bloodshed the situation seems to be frozen, a part of Croatia amputated by a 
minority, that does not want to see Croatia as its home state.
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The case of the Krajina Serbs shows to which extremes negative security 
perceptions (i.e. perceptions of existence of threat) may carry the day if the 
issue is not handled skillfully and carefully.
4.10. ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO/A
The Albanians make up an overwhelming majority in Kosovo/a's population 
and with that ratio a substantial minority in Serbia, to which Kosovo/a is 
attached.
The Albanian nationalist movement whose first manifesto was declared in the 
Kosovar town Prizren in 1878 basically aimed to unite all the Albanians in an 
autonomous state under the Ottoman rule. Rival nationalist movements, the 
Greek one to the south and the Serbian one to the north meanwhile aimed to 
devour portions of the Albanian inhabited lands. This is why following W.W.I 
Kosovo/a, passed to the Serbian hands to became part of the first Yugoslav 
state. 25
A satellite of Italy during W.W.I, Albania managed to capture the entire 
Kosovo/a and parts of Macedonia during the war as a reward for its support to 
Italy in the area. The experience of uniting all the Albanians in one state 
failed, however, with the end of W.W.II.26 Kosovo/a was returned to Serbia to 
become an autonomous republic within the Second Yugoslavia, under Serbian 
control. In the immediate aftermath of the war when Yugoslavia enjoyed a 
monopoly over the miming of Albania's domestic and foreign affairs, Kosovo/a 
acted as a bridge between the two countries. Therefore for the first time under 
Serbian mle the Kosovar Albanians were granted certain minority rights.
When Yugoslavia broke from away the Stalinist camp complying with the 
Comintern request, Albania, severed all its ties with Yugoslavia.27 Yugoslavia 
retaliated by confiscating the rights of the Kosovar Albanians. The policy of 
discrimination towards the Albanians which included seeing them as second 
class citizens lasted till 1974. By that time with their high population growth- 
rate, the highest in Europe, Albanians had become an overwhelming majority 
in Kosovo/a. The principle of equal treatment and punishment against, the 
nations pushed Tito towards some kind of action against Serbia, once he had 
cmshed the Croat nationalist movement in 1971.2» xito seems to have thought 
that the separation of Kosovo/a and Vojvodina would be a punishment of equal 
suffering to the Serbs. At the same time deciding to reform the Yugoslav
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federal structure in order to quieten Croat and Serbian chauvinisms, Tito acted 
by changing the status of the two de jure autonomous regions, Kosovo/a and 
the Vojvodina, still under Serbian rule. The new legislation enacted turned 
these two republics into de facto constituent republics of the Yugoslav state 
although they legally remained under Serbian rule as autonomous regions. 
Increased administrative and political rights turned the Vojvodina and 
Kosovo/a into powerful mini-states to the extent that Serbia could not mingle 
with the internal affairs of these two regions whereas they could interfere with 
the legislative procedure of the Serbian parliament.29
Eventually, this situation started to be perceived by the Serbs as a threat to 
Serbian unity and existence. The fact that the Albanians constituted an 
overwhelming majority in Kosovo/a which is situated next to Albania now had 
its own political structure worried Serbia. Although Albania showed no serious 
interest in the region and the Kosovar Albanians showed no affection to 
Albania, but they struggled to obtain the status of full-fledged constituent 
republic instead of an autonomous region, Serbia was still anxious about 
Kosovo/a's annexation to Albania.
Acting through such a subjectively perceived threat Serbia utilized all methods 
to suppress, strip them off from their rights and gradually alienate the 
Albanians. Step by step all rights granted to the Kosovo/a autonomous region 
were abolished. Meanwhile discrimination against the Albanians together with 
police measures, human rights abuses and physical punishment added to the 
anxiety of the Albanians over their future. Desperate and worried about 
survival the Albanian minority gradually turned towards Albania. To note 
here, despite Serbian claims, Albania with its population of circa 3 million 
never -and could not have- acted as a mother state to a community of 2 million 
Albanians, till the very late 1980s when human rights abuses reached some 
massive scales. The tribal/ cultural differences between the Albanians in 
Kosovo/a, who are Ghegas and in Albania proper, who are Toskas; economic 
disparities between the more developed Kosovo/a and the poorer Albania 
proper as well as lack of common political memory since the end of the 
Ottoman rule -except a brief Albanian invasion of Kosovo/a during W.W.II- all 
made Albania a very unlikely candidate to be a mother state to the community. 
The fact that even the interpretation of Albanian nationalism differed was 
another factor contributing to the diversions between the Kosovar and Albanian 
Albanians. In Kosovo/a the predominantly Muslim character of the population 
has developed a sense of being Albanian that is equal to being a Muslim.
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However, Albania proper that has a population divided into four different faiths 
the consciousness of being Albanian is in no case related to confession.
Despite all these differences, however, increasing Serbian repression, Serbia's 
groundless phobia over Kosovo/a's annexation to Albania and the anxiety felt 
by Albania over the fate of the Kosovar Albanians gradually gravitated Albania 
towards Kosovo/a, and vice versa. Today increased tension in Kosovo/a 
continues. Meanwhile now more vocal on the Kosovo/a issue, Albania has 
made it clear that, if tension in Kosovo/a escalates, it will not hesitate to act. 
This has fed Serbia's concern that Albania intends to annex Kosovo/a. Today 
the situation in Kosovo/a has brought Albania and Serbia (a.k.a. the new 
Yugoslav federation) to a situation of cold war. If the situation in Kosovo/a 
deteriorates, there is no guarantees that this will not turn into an armed conflict 
between Serbia and Albania over Kosovo/a. The situation in Kosovo/a is a 
good example of how a minority repressed and left desperate about its survival 
by its very home state may look for, emulate and eventually create a mother 
state.
4.11. ALBANIANS IN MACEDONIA
The Albanians in Macedonia form the majority of the population in Western 
Macedonia, adjacent to Albania in the west and Kosovo/a in the north. In the 
overall population of the country. Macedón official statistics claim Albanians 
to be around 20% while Albanians claim to be anywhere from 40% to 50%. 
Also in this case it seems difficult to tell the accuracy of both of the claims 
because of lack of objectivity in both of the estimates, where Albanians and 
Macedonians respectively try to inflate and deflate the percentage of the 
Albanian community in Macedonia's overall population.
Being Ghegas and having shared a common political history for the last 80 
years with the Albanians in Kosovo/a, the Macedón Albanians show great 
similarity to their brethren in Kosovo/a. The already close links between the 
Albanians of Kosovo/a and Macedonia were strengthened during the second 
Yugoslavia as Kosovo/a became the center for Yugoslavia's Albanians. An 
example to increased affinities is the large number of Macedón Albanians who, 
for example, went to college not in Macedonia but in Kosovo/a. Till the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia Kosovo/a remained to be a magnet for Yugoslavia's 
and also Macedonia's Albanians.
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Therefore, falling apart from Kosovo/a with the establishment of a Macedón 
state, the Albanian minority in Macedonia started to show serious signs of 
discomfort. To all intents and purposes, an independent Macedonia would 
mean for its Albanians a cut off from Kosovo/a for good.
At the same time the Macedonian government feeling uneasy about rival 
nationalisms -challenging the Macedón state and national identity- regarded 
the presence of Albanian majority on its border with Albania as a burden on its 
already questioned u n i t y T h e r e  were perceptions that the Albanian minority 
could aspire for the Albanian state in the midst of all the confusion Macedonia 
was experiencing at the time. The constitutional amendment being realized as 
a result of these perceptions reduced the status of Albanians from a 
constitutionally recognized nationality to a bare minority. Feeling humiliated 
the Albanian community retaliated now that its centrifugalist tendencies were 
strengthened. The boycott of the general census in 1990 was just one example 
of this nature the Albanian community tried to make it clear that it did not like 
the idea of living in a Macedón state as a simple minority. The withdrawal 
from public life continued when the Albanian community unilaterally declared 
an independent Albanian state (the Ilirid Republic) in western Albania.32
Since then, the Macedonian government, now alarmed about the serious 
situation, has stepped back trying to appease the Albanian community.
Restoring certain rights back to this community the Macedonian state has, for 
example by establishing an all inclusive technocratic government, tried to re 
include the Albanians into Macedonian affairs. Despite this however there 
have been limited skirmishes between the Macedonian security forces and the 
Albanian demonstrators on various occasions, and this proves that the issue 
remains to be a delicate one.
As in the Kosovo/a case, the Albanian government is a late comer in the issue 
of the Macedonian Albanians. In addition to the links between the Kosovar 
and Macedonian Albanians, the cultural and historical differences between the 
Albanians in Macedonia and Albania proper makes the Macedón Albanians 
gravitate towards Albania and the vice versa very unlikely. In fact Albania 
started to express its concerns for the Albanian community in Macedonia very 
late, only when the Macedonian government initiated the violation of the rights 
of the Albanians.
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Today as its initial negative security perception of the Macedonian government 
to see the Albanians as a threat to its unity wanes, the Macedonian government 
more and more tries to accommodate the Albanian community. Despite this 
fact however, the Albanian community -at least some certain segments of it- 
does not yet seem ready to settle the issue.^^
The problem here is that the Albanian community in Macedonia regards itself 
to be closely linked to Kosovo/a, a quasi-mother state. In that case where the 
outcome of the situation in Kosovo/a is still uncertain with possible spillover 
effects to Macedonia, it has fallen to Albania, the pseudo-mother state in that 
case to reconcile the Macedonian Albanians and the Macedonian government.
The Albanians of Macedonia constitute a particular case with two mother 
states, one quasi and one pseudo. The security perception of the minority is 
based primarily not on its own existence but on threats to the existence of its 
quasi-mother state. In that respect the case of the Albanian minority in 
Macedonia represents the relationship where the security perception of a 
mother state shapes that of the minority.
76
Today, as we have seen during the last few years, the Balkans seem to be an 
area ridden with conflicts. Many, if not all, of these conflicts seem to be of 
ethnic nature. If the was in Bosnia-Herzegovina with its history of ethnic 
cleansing, separatism, foreign involvement of neighboring powers and 
chauvinism could be cited as the most fore coming example to such conflicts, 
the deteriorating situation in Kosovo/a and also Macedonia should not be 
forgotten. Increasing tension in Kosovo/a between Albanians and the Serbian 
government on the one hand and that in Macedonia between the Macedonian 
government and the large Albanian government seem not only to be closely 
related but also possess equal importance as issues of extremely high tension 
with strong likelihood of flare-up. Another potential source of crisis in the 
southern Balkans, the issue of the Greek minority in Albania continues to 
deteriorate relations. A little to the north, the situation in Croatia between the 
Croatian government on the one hand, and the Serbian minority/ the self- 
declared Krajina Republic, that was seemingly deep-frozen until spring 1995 
has once more proven its capacity to take a violent dimension with renewed 
fighting in the area.
In Northern Balkans, the Magyar community in Transylvania and the Banat of 
Romania, long restless, but especially so since the coup in Romania against 
Ceausescu remains a throne in the Hungaro-Romanian relations, to the extent 
that Romania feeling insecure about its territorial integrity and Hungary feeling 
uneasy about the future of this vibrant community refrain from developing 
warm relations needed for regional cooperation and development.
In the southeast of the peninsula, the issue of the Turkish minority in Western 
Thrace not only continues to be a problematic one, influencing, Turco-Greek 
relations but also stands yet another a proof as to which extent a minority could 
negatively deteriorate the course of relations between its mother and host states, 
increasing mutual feeling of distrust and perceptions of threat.
Also in the southeastern Balkans, the Turks of Bulgaria contribute to the course 
of Turco-Bulgarian relations in a slightly different manner. The Turkish/ 
Muslim minority in Bulgaria which once upon a time, by late 80's, brought its 
mother and host states to the brink of a full-scale war, today, occupies a very 
precarious position. The end of scientiGc communism in Bulgaria brought 
about few changes to that country, one of which was an ofEcial end to, and a
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denouncement of, the assimilation policy. In return for this, the Turkish 
community appeared on the political spectrum of Bulgaria, as a community of 
Bulgarian citizens of Turkish origin. The Turkish government, responded quite 
positively: together with the Bulgarian government it initiated an era ofM endly 
relations, while keeping its distance from the Turkish minority with regards to 
its political actions in Bulgaria. This process was followed by a stage of 
confidence building measures heW/een the two countries and their armed forces 
and also economic cooperation, involving the private sectors of both countries. 
In the meantime, the Bulgarian government gradually took steps to ameliorate 
the legal situation of the minority.
Today, by no means, the issue of the Turkish minority is a problem-free one. 
On the contrary, nationalist circles within the minority such as the Kirdzhali 
group, which now speaks in favor of a federal solution, thus nurturing the 
Cyprus syndrome in Bulgaria, on the one hand; and certain groups in the 
Bulgarian public equating wider cultural/political rights for the minority with 
nothing but treason on the other, are among those that pose possible barriers to 
an eventual solution of the problem.
An analysis of the past and present situation of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria 
should be illuminating especially from the following points of view:
The issue of minorities in the Balkan countries is not likely to be tackled unless 
both the mother and host states show willingness and political commitment to 
solve the problem. Such political commitments in turn necessitate and should 
produce stages of confidence building measures, economic cooperation, 
rapprochement between the military and political circles.
A solution can not be arrived at until the host states start to regard the 
minorities as an integral part of their existence. Such an understanding, 
bringing with itself a gradual granting of cultural and political rights and an 
amelioration of the political situation, if necessary, should be carried out with 
caution. Such caution should aim at graduality, so as not to scare the public 
whereby a more speedy process could look to the people as if their government 
was promoting separatism, dialogue with the m inority and finally an eye to 
marginalize nationalist opposition within the m inority and the general public by 
following policies to be so devised, making there arguments sound irrelevant to 
the majority of the population.
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Last but not least, it should not be forgotten that each Balkan country, and as 
well minority has its sui-generis history and, therefore, the Bulgarian case, 
which is in no way close to perfection given all its shortcomings, should not be 
treated as a Balkan wide applicable model. On the contrary, the Bulgarian case 
should be seen as a source of inspiration and a reference point by all these 
parties, who being aware of new bloodshed aspire for solutions.
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